The Ottoman-French
Connection: The Disintegration of Pax
Ottomanica in the Napoleonic Era
To initiate
amicable relations with an alliance within a milieu of adversaries may seem
rather difficult. However, to maintain
trust and confidence within that particular relationship could perhaps seem
somewhat impossible, especially when one specific member of the alliance
gradually manifests a decline in potency.
Thus the relationship disintegrates, due to the immense pressure, and
eventually evolves into a vast schism and vehement distrust. This exact paradigm marked the Franco-Ottoman
pax ottomanica.[1]
Since
the unification of the Spanish and Austria-Hungarian thrones, known as the
Hapsburg Empire or the Holy Roman Empire, France
and the Ottoman Empire constructed a
juxtaposed alliance to contest the rising threat with military, economic, and
social collaborations. Nevertheless, the
pax ottomanica did not sustain indefinitely throughout the French and Ottoman
connection, nor did the relationship sustain mutual trust after the invasion of
Egypt
by Napoleon in the summer of 1798.
Therefore even though the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica sustained
an amicable non-inter-combatant alliance that instituted military, social, and
economic collaborations for almost three centuries, the invasion of Egypt by
Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 instigated disintegration within the dynamics of the
relationship as well as suspicion and infidelity.
Pre-Napoleonic Era: The Creation
of the Pax Ottomanica
After
the Electors proclaimed Charles V of the Hapsburg Empire as the Holy Roman
Emperor in 1521 and Francis I of France
was imprisoned for defiance in 1525, the French sought assistance from the Ottoman Empire which was the only power deemed formidable
enough to defy the Hapsburg Empire and preserve the European states.[2] This invitation for aide commenced a
burgeoning relationship between the two states committed to challenge the
Hapsburg claim to world supremacy. In
1526 the Ottoman state, led by the more than capable Suleyman the Magnificent,
inaugurated the military segment of the alliance by advancing the campaign in
Hungry, which directly threatened the back door of the Hapsburg Empire.[3]
The military alliance
retained a more formalized rhetoric in response to Genoese Admiral Andrea
Dorea’s crusade and capture of Tunis
in July of 1535. With the threat of this
new crusade and prominence of Admiral Dorea, the French and Ottomans realized
that a joint effort against their adversaries was most beneficial.[4] Furthermore, in 1536, the French-Ottoman
joint military coalition advanced into Italy; the Ottomans advanced from
the south by sea as the French upheld simultaneous pressure from the north by
land. However, the French withdrew their
military forces due to significant religious influence propagated directly from
the papal institution.[5] Yet even though Suleyman the Magnificent felt
somewhat betrayed, the French mended any damage sustained by warning Suleyman
of an upcoming Christian crusade against the Muslims in 1542.[6]
After the
redemption of the French in the Ottoman perspective, the military relations
continued to flourish with the ratification of an official treaty signed on the
1st of August, 1547. This
treaty constituted the realization that the French alliance was an extremely
vital concession. Scholar Halil Inalcik
states, “The French alliance was the cornerstone of Ottoman policy in Europe.”[7] In other words, France
acted as a vital conduit to Europe, as well as played a significant role in
maintaining the contemporary status-quo and preventing Hapsburg domination in Europe.
While the Franco-Ottoman
military partnership continued to cultivate, the initiation of economic
concessions also rendered a more lucrative proliferation. In February of 1536, the first unofficial Franco-Ottoman
trade agreement was reached and the paradigm for the particular capitulations
was patterned after preceding arrangements with Venice
and Genoa.[8] The capitulations for the French offered an
unreserved freedom to travel within the Eastern
Mediterranean as well as immense benefits concerning trade in
Ottoman ports.
Specifically, the
Ottoman capitulations granted France
entrance into the Ottoman market which created a sense of commercial autonomy
within the state. Within these
capitulations, the French established a Frankish-like millet milieu governed by
the rule of French ambassadors and representatives, by whom, operated French
courts upheld by French law, which were all within the Ottoman state. In addition, customs rates were calculated at
an especially minute rate to further indemnify trade and provide sufficient
monetary gain.[9] The Franco-Ottoman capitulations were
officially ratified, by the sultan and the Sublime Porte, as legal and
authentic on the 18th
of October, 1569 .[10]
This economic agreement
further solidified the Ottoman foreign policy in regards to France being the cornerstone and
window to the west.[11] Moreover, since the French were basically the
first official state to receive official capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, France fortified the most significant economic
dependence as well as a pervasive influence in Ottoman commerce, especially
pertaining to Egypt.[12]
Finally, within
the culminating affects of such a long term partnership, the Franco-Ottoman
alliance obviously benefited socially as well as militarily and economically. In terms of social influence, the secular
modernity of the French reflected a romantic mystique and a lucid aspiration to
modernize or reform one’s state rather than diminish continually in decline. Initially, the Ottoman military capacity
masked an internal decline. Albeit, the
wake of western modernity ameliorated European military might to such a
significant advantage, the apparent Ottoman decline was no longer able to hide
behind the façade of their gilded military.[13] Furthermore, it was absolutely essential to
initiate some kind of change or reform to meet the demands of a more modern
world and to oppose the decline, particularly regarding the systematic,
militaristic, and economic set backs vis-à-vis the Ottoman state which
apparently originated this decline.
Consequently, the
Ottoman state sought out their French alliance to again assist them in this
improvement project. One of the most
significant proponents of Ottoman reform was the Sultan Selim III. Even before Selim was sultan, and still as a
resident of the palace kafes, Selim
corresponded with Louis XVI of France,
from whom, offered patronage and advice to the fledgling leader.[14] Selim, accordingly, initiated reforms within
the Ottoman state based on a western paradigm of thought to save his state from
internal and external threats.[15]
Although many of
Selim’s reforms encompassed around his Nizam-I
Cedid army, since French instructors were mainly used to train the troops
within this new institution and demonstrate the pattern for military reforms,
the French language as well as French intellectualism lingered within the
Ottoman state.[16] This remained a reoccurring facet within Ottoman
reforms and intellectual movements, especially concerning the education of the
Ottoman academics in both the Ottoman state and France, as well as the pervasive
influence of the French Revolution of 1789.
Hence, not only did
the French Revolution cast a negative shadow in regards to the nationalistic
ideologies of non-Muslim uprisings, such as the Greek independence movement, it
also affected the Muslim conservative religious effort, namely the ulema,
to also look at French enlightenment with disdain.[17] However the French Revolution greatly
inspired a modern, secular, intellectual response responsible for the
modernization of a Turkish state, Turkish nationalism, and the Turkish
education system, namely sponsored by the Young Ottomans as well as the Young
Turks.[18] Thus it is apparent that the Franco-Ottoman
alliance also significantly influenced the social status of the Ottoman state.
With the
establishment of pax ottomanica, the Franco-Ottoman alliance
cultivated a solidified relationship of trust and dependence in a collaborated
effort to sustain military, economic, and social support in order to
prosper. This rapport, however,
extensively shifted as a result of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and the continued
betrayal of Ottoman confidence.[19] Notwithstanding, it is easy to understand
within the historical analysis of Napoleon’s life, as well as the steady
decline of the coined “sick man of Europe,” why Napoleon and France sought
diplomacy with more prominent allies at the end of the eighteenth and beginning
of the nineteenth centuries.
The Disintegration of the Pax
Ottomanica during the Napoleonic Era
After the French
Revolution and before Napoleon Bonaparte instituted his reign as emperor, the
Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica alliance experienced an
immense strain with the expedition into Egypt by Napoleon as a means to rout
the British’s, who were the last power left from the War of the First
Coalition, commercial enterprise and trade in the Ottoman state and India. However, not only was Egypt a means to
disrupt the economic stability and concessions of Britain, it seemed that
Napoleon preserved an intrinsic fascination with the enchantment of the East,
as well as being a keystone in which he could possibly secure a legacy in
history. Also, Napoleon used his
expedition into Egypt
as an altruistic contrivance to overcome Mamluk control and appear as if the
French maintained Ottoman interests as an ally.
Nonetheless, it was Napoleon’s malcontent and disparagement of the Ottoman
regime that changed French-Ottoman relations and shifted the Ottoman confidence
from trust to suspicion.
As Selim the Grim
expanded Ottoman territory victory after victory, campaign after campaign, the gazi Sultan noticed the prolific
benefits of Egypt. Egypt boasted a prominent economy
in regards to trade and agriculture as well as a well fortified location and
proximity to the Hijaz which hosted the center of Islam and its two most holy
sites.[20] Yet Egypt
was controlled by the Mamluk regime, which descended from medieval elite
warriors originating from the Caucasus Mountains. The Mamluks first appeared in Egypt
in 1230 and quickly retained suzerainty in 1252 after assassinating Sultan
Ashraf Moussa.[21] The Mamluk authority in Egypt remained absolute until Selim the Grim seized
Syria, Egypt, and the
Hijaz in 1517 and catapulted Ottoman control over both the resources and
provincial administration.[22]
Nevertheless, the
Mamluks still maintained a significant role in Egypt after the conquest and
incorporation by the Ottomans. For as
the Ottoman central government continued to weaken, the remaining Mamluk Beys retained administrative positions
which included ayans as well as ciftliks. As the provincial Ottoman leadership, mainly
held by the defterdar and qadis, began to loosen in Egypt,
the Mamluk Beys consolidated further
control over the province by administering iltizams
or tax farming.[23] The iltizams
significantly provided control of finances to promote Mamluk affluence and
power in Egypt
by the time of Napoleon’s expedition.[24] Napoleon used the Mamluk eminence to justify
his expedition into Egypt
with the Porte.
For Napoleon, the
East (the Near East, from Egypt
to India)
always conceded an essence of mystical enchantment. As a young man, Napoleon received a
fundamental education of the classics and gravitated towards the heroic
military conquests of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar.[25] These military leaders of legend lent a grand
paradigm of aspiration for Napoleon. Thus
the East not only offered the opportunity to seek glory, it also founded
Napoleon’s romantic conception to leave his legacy, an empire, in the pages of
history.[26] It is quite Ironic to note that the Nazis
regime, during the 1930’s and 1940’s, had a similar aspiration with their
desire to create the Third Reich or empire following the original two empires
of Alexander and Caesar. Napoleon instigated
the Egyptian expedition on his own monetary funds and departed from Camp Formio
to entertain his fantastic aspirations. Thus,
as Alexander the Great started his campaign in Egypt, so did Napoleon.
It seemed that all
forces of nature were pulling Napoleon to the East and Egypt. Napoleon’s background and aspirations all
enveloped in the mystique of the East, as if beckoning him to entertain all
desires to etch his name into the fabric of history. In addition, Egypt
appeared profitable for the reaping of the French Republic. Primarily, Egypt was a perfect staging point
to gain advantage in the continuing Anglo-Franco aggression.
Napoleon
formulated two possible strategic advantages which merited from the control of Egypt. First, France
could establish a lucrative colony along the Nile River Delta which would
provide benefits from trade, Mediterranean and Red Sea
ports, and resources from colonialism.
However, most importantly, Egypt
could be used as a strategic stronghold in deposing Britain and her colonies. Britain’s
commercial strength exhibited a great weakness in Egypt. Thus after establishing a stronghold in Egypt, France could monopolize the trading
routes by both land and sea. The French
saw this advantage as an opportunity to block communication between Britain
and her colonies and hinder British commerce.
Moreover, Egypt yet
again demonstrated its opportune geography as a perfect staging point to launch
direct assaults on India, which
was Britain’s
most profitable colony.[27]
Napoleon perfectly
depicts, in his own words, the benefits of an Egyptian expedition in a letter
to his Soldiers on the 2nd of July, 1798. Using classical rhetoric and the paradigm of
both Alexander and the Roman legions, Napoleon instigates resolve amongst his
men with claims that manifest destiny will favor the French mission to defeat
the Mamluk Beys and smite a crucial
blow to Britain.[28] Napoleon successfully landed at Alexandria, the city
founded by his hero Alexander the Great, on the 1st of July, 1798 . Yet, the Mamluks responded with a
counteroffensive that culminated at the Battle
of the Pyramids on the 21st of that same month. Even though the Mamluk forces battled with a
significantly larger force, they were no match for the military might of the
French as well as the military brilliance of Napoleon. Consequently, the French suffered only nine
fatalities with one hundred wounded, while over sixteen hundred Mamluks soldiers
perished.[29]
With this victory,
as previously mentioned, Napoleon again writes that the French sought revenge
on the Mamluks for the many humiliations prompted upon French merchants, as
well as for the defense of Islam and to assist the sultan in retaining control
over the Egyptian province.[30] Napoleon’s letter may have pacified the
Egyptians, but the French invasion only infuriated the Ottoman regime and
destroyed the contemporary Franco-Ottoman relations. On the 9th of September, 1798 , the Porte declared
war and jihad against their former allies.[31]
As Napoleon
quickly arose to power with the defeat of the Mamluks and also from controlling
former Mamluk tax farms to finance his eastern campaign, Napoleon and his
cohorts soon experienced many hardships inherent with the East. On the 1st of August, 1798 , Napoleon found himself
stranded in the East after the British Admiral Nelson routed the French fleet
in Aboukir Bay.
In spite of this misfortune and as he followed in the footsteps of his
hero Alexander, Napoleon and his forces continued on with the Eastern
expedition which further prolonged their suffering. After many hardships, including disease and
hunger due to a poor supply line, Napoleon failed to seize Acre, which
Alexander had besieged and won twenty-two centuries earlier, and was forced to
return to France to battle the Second Coalition coordinated by Austria, Britain,
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.[32]
The Franco-Ottoman
pax ottomanica ruptured for the first time since its initial composition. The Ottomans continued with anti-Napoleon and
anti-French sentiments by first creating an alliance between Muslim and
Christian powers in 1799 and then by signing the Treaty of Defensive Alliance
of September of 1805 with Russia
and Britain.[33] This permitted Russian warships passage
within the Turkish Straits. This
alliance was formulated strictly to combat the rising success of Napoleon and France, except it required an unfamiliar
allegiance between two natural enemies, Russia and the Ottomans. The synthetic relationship imposed between Russia and the
Ottoman state soon fell as a result of French diplomacy. Since Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt, somehow,
Selim III reconciled differences with Napoleon and condoned the betrayal of
their allegiance. For Selim still
admired France
and their alliance still warranted a natural connection. Thus in 1806, Selim recognized Napoleon as the
rightful Emperor of France and withdrew from their previous alliance with Russia and Britain.[34] This turn of events, of course, ignited
Russian and British indignation, but it was Selim who declared war on Russia
on the 27th of
December, 1806 . Still, the
Russian military was far superior to that of the Ottomans and rapidly advanced
into Bucharest, Wallachia, Bessarabia and even
the mouth of the Dardanelles in the early
months of 1807. Unfortunately for the
Ottoman state, the paucity of French reinforcements left the Ottomans to fend
for themselves.[35]
The year 1807
again manifested misfortune for the Ottomans, but this time the origins were
due to both internal and external strife.
The ayans, ulema, and janissary corps toppled Selim
in an orchestrated coup which raised Mustafa IV to sultan and disposed of the Nizam-I Cedid. Mustafa maintained Franco-Ottoman relations
and depended significantly on their formidable ally with the utmost
confidence. However, this confidence was
again misplaced. Napoleon again sought
to take advantage of his alliance with the Ottoman state to secure an even more
profitable alliance. Napoleon first met
and signed the Treaty of Finkenstein, in May of 1807, with Iran, ensuring support for an Iranian campaign
to reconquer the Caucasus as well as India.[36] Additionally, Napoleon and Alexander I met in
the German town of Tilsit
on the 7th of July, 1807, to discuss the annexation of Ottoman
territories, since the Ottoman military was so inefficient and impotent to
defend them. After a reconciliation
regarding the Ottoman territories was reached between France and Russia,
France
persuaded the Ottoman state to sign an armistice with their infamous Russian adversary. Yet the armistice never secured Russia’s
commitment, thus confirming French perfidy and betrayal.[37]
The Ottoman
government had no choice but to plead with Britain to save them from certain
annihilation, since they now found themselves shoved between two enemies. The British and Ottomans signed the
Dardanelles Treaty of Peace on the
5th of January, 1809 .
Again Napoleon sought to reform the pax
ottomanica with the recently ascended
sultan, Mahmud II, but trust and confidence in Napoleon and France had
completely disintegrated. Thus, instead
of a final renewal of a once prosperous relationship, where France acted as a cornerstone for the Ottoman
foreign policy vis-à-vis the west, the Ottoman state realized that they would
never fully trust France
again. Consequently, the Ottoman Porte
signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Russia on the 28th of May, 1812 .[38]
Post Napoleonic Era and Pseudo
Franco-Ottoman Relations
After the defeat
of Napoleon and his banishment to first the Island of Elba
and then to the Island of St. Helena,
the world began to repair and reorganize that which Napoleon’s so-called legacy
left in shambles. The Congress of Vienna
was the world’s attempt to mend all that was broken. Napoleon had left the continent in disarray
which left nations, especially France
[initially], to adopt anti-nationalistic sentiments to avoid further wars.[39] As a result, one of the most orchestrated
policies that engendered from the Congress of Vienna of 1815 was the
preservation of the Ottoman Empire, which
survived virtually unscathed, as the essential key in the European status-quo.[40] Accordingly, the Ottomans were initiated in
the Concert of Europe and were finally able, for a time, to focus on internal
elements of the Ottoman government.
Yet, even though
France and the Ottomans were united within the Concert of Europe and bound by
the Congress of Vienna, still the mistrust resonated from Napoleon’s
betrayals. A pseudo alliance was thus
created between the French and Ottomans where dissension prevailed whenever
justified. The Ottoman’s still used France as link to western modernity, but France never
retained the loyalty and trust of the Ottoman state. France openly participated in supporting
Muhammad ‘Ali’s reform policies which assisted Egypt in ameliorating their
education system as well as modernizing their military and economy, which in
time, opposed the Ottoman sovereignty.[41] Also, France
participated in a territorial squabble with the Ottoman state in regards to the
annexation of Algeria
in 1830.[42] Therefore, the relationship between France and the Ottoman
Empire was never repaired and continued to disintegrate over time
until they found themselves once again as adversaries in World War I.
In closing, it is safe to argue that the
decision for Napoleon to ultimately betray the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica,
which had flourished for almost three preceding centuries, was the direct
consequence of the steady decline of the Ottoman state and lack of military
prowess. If the Ottoman state had
maintained its efficiency as during the times of Suleyman the Magnificent,
Napoleon would have greatly benefited from the Franco-Ottoman alliance because
of geographical and ideological advantages. Yet since the Ottoman inefficiency confirmed
its weakened state, Napoleon betrayed an ever so solid pax ottomanica connection
which led to the disintegration of Franco-Ottoman confidence and trust.
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(Vol. 41 Issue 1), 5-16.
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Some Long-Term Trends.” Napoleon in Egypt.
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Limited, 2003.
Herold, J. Christopher. Bonaparte
in Egypt. New
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Hess, Andrew C. “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the
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Kolla, Edward James. “Not So Criminal: New Understandings of Napoleon’s
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Lewis, Bernard. The
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International
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Shaw, Stanford
J. History
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Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman
Empire, 1280-1808, Volume 1.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976.
Shaw, Stanford J.
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Alice. The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna
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[1] Nelly
Hanna, “Ottoman Egypt and
the French Expedition: Some Long-Term Trends,” Napoleon in Egypt,
(United Kingdom:
Garnet Publishing Limited, 2003), 11. Pax ottomanica
referenced the Franco-Ottoman treaty signed 1 August 1547; lasted until
Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt
in 1798.
[2] Halil
Inalcik, The Ottoman
Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London: Phoenix Press,
1973), 35.
[3] Inalcik,
35.
[4] Stanford
J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire
and Modern Turkey: Empire of
the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire,
1280-1808, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 97.
[5] Shaw,
Vol.1, 98-99.
[6] Shaw,
Vol. 1, 102.
[7] Inalcik,
37.
[8] Shaw,
Vol. 1, 97.
[9] Shaw,
Vol. 1, 97.
[10]
Inalcik, 137.
[11]
Inalcik, 137.
[12] J.
Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt,
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 10.
[13] Bernard
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 56.
[14] Lewis,
56.
[15] Efraim
Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the
Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press), 9.
[16] Lewis,
57.
[17] Serif
Mardin, “The Influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman
Empire,” International
Social Science Journal, February 1989, (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 17.
[18]
Bertrand Badie, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Muslim Societies:
Evidence and Ambiguities,” International Social Science Journal,
February 1989, (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 11.
[19] Mardin,
17.
[20] Andrew
C. Hess, “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt
(1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War,” International Journal of Middle
East Studies, January 1973, (Vol. 4 Issue 1), 55.
[21] Herold,
7.
[22] Hess,
55.
[23] Hanna,
6-7.
[24] Hanna,
7.
[25] Edward
James Kolla, “Not So Criminal: New Understandings of Napoleon’s Foreign Policy
in the East,” French Historical Studies,
Spring 2007, (Vol. 30 Issue 2), 177.
[26] Kolla,
179.
[27] Kolla,
182-184.
[28] Captain
Joseph-Marie Moiret, translated and edited by Rosemary Brindle, Memoirs of Napoleon’s Egyptian Expedition,
1798-1801, (London: Grenhill Books, 2001), 39.
[29] Moiret,
55.
[30] Moiret,
43.
[31] Kolla,
186.
[32] Kolla,
185 and 188
[33] Karsh,
11.
[34] Karsh,
12.
[35] Karsh,
13.
[36]
Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History
of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey:
Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, Vol. 2,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 16.
[37] Karsh,
14-15.
[38] Karsh,
15-17.
[39] Hannah
Alice Straus, The Attitude of the
Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy,
and Poland,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 151.
[40] Karsh,
17.
[41] Hanna,
10-11.
[42] Hanna,
11.
