Middle Eastern History

Articles:
1. The Mihna: Ma'mun's Inquisition for Supremacy
2. The Ottoman-French Connection: The Disintegration of Pax Ottomanica in the Napoleonic Era 
3. The Domestic Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II: Ottoman Ambitions to Ascendancy
4. Is Russia the greatest threat in the Middle East (blog post)?
5. A Lack of Religious Education for Muslims Continues to Spawn Acts of Terror (blog post)
6. All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, by Stephen Kinzer.  New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003 (book review).

 

1. The Mihna: Ma’mun’s Inquisition for Supremacy (Middle Eastern History, Medieval)

 

Abstract

There is still a great deal of uncertainty why in fact Ma’mun implemented an inquisition (mihna), from 833 to 845 CE, amongst the very Islamic community (umma) he was leading.  Many historians have argued that the mihna was actually instigated to recentralize the political authority of the caliphate to counteract a burgeoning movement of religious leadership within the umma; others have disputed that the mihna was enacted to discourage religious interpretation on a local, unofficial level by those same leaders.  These two hypotheses have both dominated mihna research throughout modern scholarship, yet they have both been isolated as separate reasons for the implementation of the mihna.  However, Ma’mun strategically initiated the mihna as a means to ascertain central leadership as well as nullify any outside claims to authority in both political and religious spheres.  Consequently by design, the umma would strictly depend on Ma’mun’s absolute authority like the prophet, Muhammad. 

Keywords:  The Mihna, Ma’mun, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ulama, Islamic Law, Islamic Theology.

 

 

Introduction: Polemics in Succession and Theology

 

During the ‘Abbasid dynastic rule over the umma or Islamic religious community, during the eighth and ninth centuries CE, an inquisition known as the mihna solidified dissent between the local and central authorities.  The mihna attempted to initiate a reconciliation and centralization of religious authority within the caliphate concerning their religious and legal authority over the umma.  This inquisition or mihna, in actuality, further dichotomized the rift between the caliph and the ulama.  The outcome greatly favored the authority of the local ulama in regards to the interpretation of Islamic law (Shari’a) and religious doctrine, in addition to how these interpretations applied to the umma. 

Today, the study of the mihna warrants a vast proposed attempt to understand the fundamental purposes of why it was initiated.   However, a common historical conclusion seems rather elusive as well as inconclusive in regards to historians’ viewpoints concerning the influencing factors and reasons behind the validation of the mihna by Ma’mun, the ‘Abbasid caliph, within the first few scores of the ninth century.  Thus it is essential to look rationally from the perspective of Ma’mun to determine the particular reasoning for the inquisition.  The two main conclusive hypotheses relating to the commencement of the mihna agree that either, the mihna was to once again centralize religious arbitration within the caliphate while legitimizing Ma’mun’s rule as caliph; or it was to oppose the local distilling effort of the traditional ulama vis-à-vis their developments in their religious interpretations of the hadith and establishment of the external schools of theology [kalam] and law [fiqh] (Zaman, 1997, p. 2).  Yet, perhaps both hypotheses congruently support each other.  For the initiation of the mihna in the perspective of the caliph Ma’mun endowed the potential ability to oppose the authority of the ulama that did not support his doctrine and leadership by nullifying any legitimacy in their leadership roles within their schools of kalam.  It also negated the ulama’s opportunity to interpret and decree on religious law or fiqh, which would indeed once again strengthen the centralized authority of the institution of the caliphate and legitimize Ma’mun’s rule as both the religious and political leader, like unto Muhammad.

After the death of the Prophet, not only did the question of succession create a slight separation and dissension within the community, another significant question arose within the nascent religion.  Who are the true believers and members of the umma? This question was a natural communalistic way of thinking for Arabs (Watt, 1985, p. 11).  Thus, this particular question encouraged interpretation and the implementation of ‘aqidahs which led to the creation and separation of theological schools of kalam and its theologians or mutakallimun.  Not only did these schools of kalam implement interpretations of Shari’a, the Qur’an, and hadith as well as the importance and relevance of each, they also cemented differentiations regarding theological dogma within the umma.  Even though the Qur’an and the hadith manifested the fundamental structure of both religious beliefs and law, the different schools of kalam demonstrated variations in both religious opinion and interpretations in each particular school.  The first two groups that established a juxtaposed spectrum of religious doctrine were the Kharijites and the Murjites (Waines, 1995, p. 104-106).

 

Kharijites and Murjites

 

The Kharijites decided initially to depose ‘Ali and the Umayyad dynasty (661-750), due to the Kharijite belief that ‘Ali and the Umayyad dynasty controlled no particular right to lead due to their veering practices and corruption (Nagel, 2000, p. 41-48).  The Kharijites principled themselves on the redeeming quality of righteousness based directly upon fundamental doctrines instituted by the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an, those which they believed the Umayyad dynasty did not prescribe to (Watt, 1985, p. 11).  Thus for the Kharijites, the authority to choose the caliph pertained directly to the true believers or those free from sin (Lapidus, 1975, p. 366).  Also, since the Kharijites believed that all sinners inherently were unbelievers, the Kharijites preserved the right to purify the nonbelievers from the flock and purge it of sin (Watt, 1985, p. 8).  Their slogan was “No obedience to the creature in disobedience of the Creator” (Nagel, 2000, p. 42).  This not only conceded a new dreadful element of moral obligation with the consequence of death attached to agency, but the Kharijites initiated the ability to schism and form a difference of opinion relating to Islamic dogma (Lapidus, 1975, p. 376).

On the other end of the spectrum, the Murjites established a different suggestion pertaining to the envelopment of sin in regards to who were actual believers (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  The Murjites ascertained the simple fact that mankind will sin because mankind is not perfect, thus the irja or postponement (suspension) of judgment will be left for God alone (Watt, 1985, p. 12).  Accordingly, a believer was one who had secured iman (belief or faith) through their knowledge of God in their mind and then essentially merited from confirmations and confessions of the heart and of the tongue (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  Ultimately, for the Murjites, God judged the true intentions of the hearts of men.  However, the problematic element within Murjite belief pertained directly to the status of works.  Murjites maintained that faith was only determined according to belief and not the acts of one’s hands (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  Therefore, if mankind testified with their tongues and hearts without manifesting assiduous works that corroborated mankind’s belief, for the Murjites, this was sufficient enough to be classified as a believer.  Consequently, a Murjite believer’s faith could potentially be as or succeed that of the Prophet as well as the righteous caliphs (Patton, 1897, p. 39).  Murjite ideals resonated deeply within Ma’mun’s concept of leadership; and perhaps, these ideals could possibly stand as a sign of legitimacy for Ma’mun’s succession if he could garner control of both religious and political spheres (Ibn Tayfur, 1987, p. 82-86).

 

The Emergence of Theological Schools and Leaders

 

As the pervasive propagation of the religious schools of kalam manifested a more prevalent and ubiquitous nature, the phenomena endorsed an affinity of depending on these schools of kalam more substantially than the caliphate; the result being an affluence of several different schools of kalam, along with several differentiations in religious dogma.  These fundamental differentiations in religious dogma, which derived from the same sources, introduced many different interpretations for the umma to follow, thus each individual within the umma chose to prescribe to a particular or specific group of Islamic kalam and fiqh.  Hence with the establishment of different schools of kalam, kalam introduced the novel institution of ulama or local religious leaders, which were able to create and gain a sense of local autonomy regarding religious interpretation.  Islamic historian Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1997) has written concerning the ulama:

 

The early ‘Abbasid period saw the emergence of the religious scholars, the ulama, as a visible and increasingly influential religious elite, the beginnings of schools of law, major developments in the study of hadith and towards the formalization of the concept of the Prophet’s sunna, and other developments which eventually led to the crystallization of Sunni and Shiite Islam. (p. 1-2)   

 

Therefore, the religious implications established regarding the nascent institution of the ulama and the establishment of schools of kalam and fiqh, which were able to interpret dogma on the local level, relinquished the centralized power and authority of the caliphate to maintain religious authority over the umma.  This separation warranted a fundamental fissure between the ideal of unity between religion and state.  Again Zaman (1997) stated:

           

This model, which postulates a comprehensive separation between religion and the state, may be paraphrased thus: the caliphs and the ulama were in sharp conflict over matters of religious authority; the caliphs lost the contest and came effectively to be excluded from all say in matters of the law and in whatever else the ulama defined as their exclusive preserve; and, once in place, this model of separation essentially persisted for much of the medieval Islamic history. (p. 2)

 

Initially the prophet Muhammad, as well as the four righteous caliphs, commenced the idea of one centralized leader manifesting both political and religious arbitration over the umma.  This idea of a philosopher or prophet king distinguished the paradigm of a noble revelatory leader with whom the religious community could rely and manifest both their religious and political confidence (Lapidus, 1975, p. 364).  This unity demonstrated sagacity as long as the leader of the umma exhibited admirable attributes behind which the community could rally.  Notwithstanding, if the leader did not manifest a sense of righteousness and charismatic prudence, a reaction of dissonance was inevitable.  This was exactly what happened within the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid dynasties (Lapidus, 1975, p. 369).  Thus in order to legitimize his rule, redefine the role of the caliph, and reestablish the authority and power within the centralized leadership, Ma’mun used the incumbent attraction of theology for political advantages and initiated the mihna to discredit the ulama, especially within the traditional schools of kalam and fiqh, those who discriminated against his logic and idea of doctrine inherent to the rationalization of the creation of the Qur’an.

First, Ma’mun desperately needed to legitimize his rule within the umma as caliph in being both lawful and as the will of God (Tabari, 1996, p. 5755).  The proceeding caliph and father of Ma’mun, Harun Rashid, bestowed the mantle of the caliphate upon his younger son, Ma’mun’s younger brother, al-Amin (Glasse, 2002, p. 284).  Hence, in order to retain the mantle of the caliphate for himself after the death of Harun Rashid, Ma’mun instigated a militant power struggle against al-Amin, which eventually enabled Ma’mun to succeed in taking the throne as caliph (Figueroa, 2007, p. 648).  Notwithstanding, since al-Amin originally received the right to rule as caliph, many traditionalists opposed the rule of Ma’mun (Glasse, 2002, p. 284).  Consequently, it became essential for Ma’mun to legitimize his rule as caliph and undermine the influence of the traditionalist in regards to the umma; so with the implementation of the mihna, which highlighted a more rationalist perspective of theological doctrine, Ma’mun outweighed traditionalist dissonance with rationalist support to manipulate the consensus and legitimize his rule as caliph over the umma.

 

Ma’mun and Ideologies

 

The persecution that was the mihna, inaugurated by al-Ma’mun on 27 January in 833, originally manifested strict disdain for schools of kalam who supported traditional orthodoxy in favor of the school within whom condoned a more rational element (Nagel, 2000, p. 109).  Ira Lapidus (1975), an expert on the mihna, has established, “In 833 al-Ma’mun inaugurated a mihna or inquisition to force government officials and religious leaders to accept his religious views and his authority in matters of religious ritual and doctrine” (p. 379).  Now instead of the polar opposition similar to that of the Kharijites and Murjites of the ninth century, Ma’mun rallied behind a more rational interpretation regarding the perspective in which the Qur’an is a temporal, created thing in contrast to the traditionalist doctrine of an uncreated, eternal Qur’an.  This belief played the most essential role within the mihna, for it was the fundamental question during the inquisition.  

Originally, historiographers exonerated this rational element of dogma by linking this belief directly to the idea that Ma’mun, to centralize his religious authority, needed to establish and solidify a set standard for religious doctrine and discredit all opposition, which of course, was traditional orthodoxy.  Furthermore, Ma’mun chose to support rational groups that collaborated with the idea of the created Qur’an.  However, historians failed to agree on which rational group truly influenced the incorporation of the created Qur’an.

Mu’tazilite Ideologies

 

After looking at the historiography relevant to the mihna, historian Walter M. Patton initially became the expert within the field with his dissertation piece in 1897 on Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and the mihna.  Patton (1897) ascribed the fundamental idea of the created Qur’an to the Mu’tazilite influence on Ma’mun (p. 47).  The Mu’tazilite school definitely fit the parameters of rationalists believing in the created Qur’an, as well as opposing traditionalists (Nagel, 2000, p. 102 and 109).  Moreover, Ma’mun could also be directly linked to the Mu’tazilite influence, since they found favor in the ‘Abbasid court and legitimized their interpretation of the Qur’an as being created in 827.

Since Patton was one of the first major scholars on the mihna and believed that Mu’tazilites deeply influenced Ma’mun’s credence for the incorporation of the created Qur’an, many historians since have agreed with this analysis.  Islamists like Amin, Hitti, Kennedy, and Watt also agreed with the analysis of Patton as well as the idea for the attempt at discrediting the opposition (Nawas, 1994, p. 616)  The direct link from Ma’mun’s mihna to the Mu’tazilites, for these historians, highlighted a direct causation for the inquisition; for the influence manifested a lucid link. 

Primarily, the theological link of the created Qur’an pertained directly to school of Mu’tazilites due to the fact that it was one of the most central themes of Mu’tazilite doctrine (Patton, 1897, p. 47).  The establishment of the created Qur’an doctrine developed directly from the Mu’tazilite definition of the fundamental and most crucial principle of tawhid which is absolutely inherent within their “five principles or fundamentals” (al-Jabbar, 1997, p. 91 and 96).  The Mu’tazilites developed these principles by the implementation of their “rational” kalam, based on the dialectic process or science, which anchored arguments on demonstrative proofs and rendered their so-called axiomatic syllogisms sound and beyond dispute since the proofs were based upon reason and the senses.  Basically, for the Mu’tazilites, it is essential to understand that God is the only existent that exists, as a necessary being, eternally within His absolute oneness.  Nothing can exist eternally outside of God and His unique essence; thus if the Qur’an was uncreated and eternal it would exist outside of God’s oneness, eternality, uniqueness, and omnipotence (Nasution, 1997, p. 190).   Therefore it is impossible for anything, including the Qur’an, to exist eternally outside of God, so the Qur’an must be created and contingent on God’s existence (al-Jabbar, 1997, p. 96-97).

In addition to a theological link, Ma’mun could have also benefited from Mu’tazilite dogma regarding the speech of God as a political tool.  According to the Mu’tazilites, God does not speak nor will He ever (Madelung, 1985, p. 506).  God is completely transcendent and does not maintain any anthropomorphic characteristics (Nasution, 1997, p. 190).  That is to say that He is a necessary existence, independent and beyond human comprehension or quality.  Thus, because of His transcendence and man’s ultimate submission to Him, there will be no likeness between the creator and the created.  In other words, for the Mu’tazilites, man and the absolute Real, in their juxtaposition, cannot maintain a similitude of qualities or attributes.  Through ta’wil or interpretation, based on reason and philology, the Mu’tazilites believed what mankind figuratively called speech was actually a particular sound created and made heard by God, so that mankind may hear and transmit that which God desired for them to hear.  Yet, since it was created by God and not the actual speech of God, the Qur’an again sustained characteristics of being created and temporal (Madelung, 1985, p. 506).  Furthermore, the words or speech of God was not immutable, thus Ma’mun could manipulate or interpret religious rulings to placate and support any law or doctrine he created.

Finally, Ma’mun maintained particularly close ties with Mu’tazilites, for even his most prominent teachers, Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf, Nazzam, Futti, Samama ibn Ashras, were Mu’tazilites (Nawas, 1994, p. 616; Ibn al-Morteza, 1988, p. 49; Mas’udi, 1970, p. 227; Ibn Khalakan, p. 177; Shahrestani, 1979, p. 71).  Moreover, the Mu’tazilites benefited from the favor of the regime within the ‘Abbasid court as the legitimate school of kalam.  Thus, it seemed that the Mu’tazilite school of kalam had solidified an essential role within the incorporation of the mihna.

However, many historians concluded that even though the Mu’tazilites might have had some influential aspects regarding Ma’mun and the incorporation of the created Qur’an during the mihna, in all honesty, it was more of a coincidence rather than a conclusive determination.  In fact, Ma’mun appeared to be supporting multifarious sources of inspiration in regards to his personal theological creeds.  For instance, it is true that Ma’mun was in contact with many Mu’tazilites, but he was also influenced by many non-Mu’tazilites.  John Nawas (1994), in his article “A Reexamination of Three Current Explanations for al-Mamun’s Introduction of the Mihna,”   proposed that, “The sources also tell us that al-Ma’mun had equally strong and intimate bonds with others outside Mu’tazilite circles, however, of whom some were in fact anti-Mu’tazilites” (p. 616). Thus, Ma’mun maintained the company of anti-Mu’tazilites such as Bishr al-Marisi, Dirar Ibn ‘Amr, and Yahya Ibn Aktham, who were open foes of the Mu’tazilites, rationalism, and even the science of kalam.

In addition, by examining the attention given to the Mu’tazilites by traditional orthodox groups to the like of Ibn Hanbal, some historians again concluded that the Mu’tazilites did not play a significant role of involvement with Ma’mun’s mihna due to the lack of attention written in traditionalists’ sources (Peters, 1976, p. 11).  Historian Christopher Melchert (1997) precluded Mu’tazilite involvement when he wrote in his article “The Adversaries of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal:” 

 

First the traditionalists’ main struggle was not against the Mu’tazila.  Had they been the main adversaries, we should have many more statements against them from Ahmad, his contemporaries and his followers.  Doubtless Ahmad and other traditionalists disagreed with the Mu’tazila and would use strong language about them; however, they saw their main adversaries elsewhere. (p. 252)

 

So for Melchert (1997), not only did the Mu’tazilites not contribute a significant influence to Ma’mun, but the Mu’tazilites only emerged as a dominant group among rationalists at the end of the ninth century (p. 252). 

This conflicting evidence certainly needs to be taken into account, for Melchert and Nawas are very bold in denying the avid Mu’tazilite role within the mihna, since, as previously mentioned, Mu’tazilite scholars mentored Ma’mun in theological studies and Ma’mun elected a central theme within Mu’tazilite doctrine.  It is safe to say that, even though the Mu’tazilites might not have directly facilitated the installation of the mihna within the ninth century, they were at the very least an indirect influence on Ma’mun and his creeds as a foundation for opposing the traditional element within the mihna.

Both Nawas (1994) and Melchert (1997) disagreed with to the idea of direct Mu’tazilite involvement.  Instead, both historians mentioned the Hanafi school as a conspiratorial participant within the mihna.  Both historians added, since the Hanifis also believed in the created Qur’an, the probability of their role within the mihna is high (Nawas, 1994, p. 617).  Albeit within the Fiqh al-Akbar of Imam al-A’zam Abu Hanifah, he wrote the contrary:

 

The Qur’an is the Word of God Almighty, written on collections of leaves (masahif), preserved in men’s hearts, recited on men’s tongues, and sent down to the Prophet, upon whom be God’s peace and blessing.  Our uttering of the Qur’an is created, and our recitation of the Qur’an is created, but the Qur’an itself is uncreated. (Lumbard, personal communication, Fall, 2007)

 

Thus, Nawas and Melchert may have misinterpreted both the involvement of the Hanafi school within the mihna as well as their fiqh regarding the Qur’an.  For in the Hanafi school of fiqh the Qur’an is uncreated, or is it?  Even though Hanifah wrote that the Qur’an is uncreated, historians have disputed the actual doctrines of the Hanafi school during the time of the mihna.  Melchert (1997) mentioned this idea in his article when he stated, “The situation was complicated by their having developed a more traditionalist party among the Hanafiya, who did not, for example, affirm a create[d] Qur’an.  Until late in the ninth century, however, the Hanafiya are mainly to be placed on the rationalist side of the great struggle” (p. 252).   Accordingly, for Melchert, the Hanafi School rebutted their own doctrine within themselves and established a complete metamorphosis of thought by adopting contrary ideas and changing from a completely disputed and rational based theology to a more traditional stance within less than a century.  To say the least, it is self-evident that the Hanafi school was becoming more dissonant within their own theology during the ninth century.  Therefore, their school of kalam could not have been a direct catalyst for the mihna because of their own inner struggle and metamorphosis that emerged during that same time period.

Shiite Ideologies

 

Another group said to influence Ma’mun concerning the mihna was the Shiite element.  Historians like Sourdel, Watt, and Nagel believed the intrinsic value of Shiite doctrine was appreciated by Ma’mun pertaining directly to the institution of the imam (Nawas, 1994, p, 619; Sourdel, 1962).  Ma’mun specifically integrated the idea of imam directly into his role as caliph (Safva, 1937, p. 377).  The role of imam greatly influenced Ma’mun for it was the exact status of Ma’mun’s ambitions (Nagel, 2000, p. 100).  In Shi’ism, the imam portrayed an essential role of veneration as both the political and religious leader of Shiites.  Also, the imam descended first from ‘Ali and then the Prophet Muhammad himself.  This amalgamation of imam and caliph, as Ma’mun believed, essentially gave him supreme autonomy over the umma as well as blood ties to ‘Ali and Muhammad.  Even though Shiites believe the Qur’an to be uncreated, the idea of the imam significantly influenced Ma’mun with regards to the potential control the mihna could provide (ibn Babevayh, p. 226-227).

            Yet even though the importance of these historical investigations helped illuminate certain aspects of the mihna, a determination could not be made regarding which rational element directly influenced Ma’mun in regards to the adaptation of the dogma in reference to the created Qur’an.  In fact, Ma’mun actually manifested an eclectic idea by incorporating different elements of rational kalam and integrating them to create a galvanized, hybrid theology which would directly cause controversy within the opposing traditional element, thus giving Ma’mun an instrument to discredit the traditional creeds (Nawas, 1994, p. 619).  Since Ma’mun demonstrated an eclectic idea of incorporating a mixture of rational and Shiite creeds to create his own proposed doctrine, modern historians realized that Patton’s original thesis regarding strictly Mu’tazilite involvement and influence in the creation of the inquisition and directly influencing Ma’mun’s created Qur’an theology was rendered insubstantial.  Therefore in retrospect of Patton’s thesis, the collaboration of the two hypotheses created a more efficient explanation for the commencement of the mihna.

            Therefore, why did Ma’mun adopt the idea of the created Qur’an?  The exact specific reason for the created Qur’an doctrine, the adopted credo, escaped explicit explanation within primary sources contemporary to the mihna.  However, by supporting one particular vantage point as well as drawing the support of that particular vantage point, Ma’mun consolidated his authority established a commonality within the status quo in regards to his definition of the ijma or consensus and by deposing and discrediting the adversity.  Ma’mun displayed a great formidability as ruler and was seriously determined to preserve the importance of the caliphate and reconfirm its absolute mantle of authority.   John Nawas (1996) explained in his subsequent article, “The Mihna of 218 A.H. /833 A.D. Revisited: An Empirical Study,” “Ma’mun was basically setting his sights on the future, aiming to secure for the caliphal institution a universal and unquestioned authority on all matters, secure and sacred, a status that was in force during the Umayyad period and was especially characteristic of the founders of Islam but had since vanished” (p. 699).  Therefore the mihna manifested the perfect opportunity for Ma’mun to consolidate his power by discrediting the local traditional ulama, so the umma would again look to a centralized figure to not only lead, but interpret the Qur’an and hadith as well.

Ideologies of the Mihna

 

With the establishment of the mihna, four months before the death of Ma’mun, he instituted an inquisition in which they questioned many ulama to determine their theological understanding and discredit any altercations.  This phenomenon provided Ira Lapidus and Wilfred Madelung the support for their thesis that the institution of the mihna combated the “festering resentments” for the opposing traditional ulama including those who maintained a Khurasanian background (Nawas, 1996, p. 699).  Thus within the initial mihna letter to governor Ishaq b. Ibrahim of Baghdad, Ma’mun first solicited the apprehension of the high officials of Baghdad, and then in later letters surmised the interrogation of the lower hierarchies of ulama.  Ma’mun specified the groups of ulama to be questioned including the “qudat (plural of qadi) and shuhud (court officials), witnesses, muhaddithun including the forty-four traditional ulama, and the fuqaha (plural of faqih) who were experts in law and theology” (Nawas, 1996, p. 707-708).   Ma’mun targeted these intellectual elite because of their exceptional character and abilities.  For these men participated within the umma as the most influencing and intellectually qualified proponents of society; therefore these men caused the diluting of the caliphate authority in relation to the interpretation of theology and law.  The most famous interrogates were those of the Shafi’i school of law in addition to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.

            During the interrogation sessions of the mihna, the persecuted were given one simple question concerning the doctrine of the creation of the Qur’an.   Is the Qur’an created?  This question provided an advantage to the persecutors since it nullified all equivocation or ambivalent dialectic debate in syllogistic form.  Either the accused agreed or disagreed (Nawas, 1994, p. 623). 

Another great advantage of this interrogation method and especially the specific question relating to the creation of the Qur’an existed within the Qur’an itself.  Consequently within the Qur’an itself, no logical or authoritative passage specifically disputes either opinion regarding the creation of the Qur’an, thus the reigning doctrine based its authenticity intrinsically upon the established structure imposed (Nawas, 1994, p. 623).  The verse in question uses the Arabic verb, Ja’ala, which has been translated as, made.  Al-Qur’an (2006) states, “We have made it an Arabic Qur’an so that you may apply reason” (43:3).

Within the examination of the mihna and the opinion of the created Qur’an, Ma’mun divulged a common understanding regarding Qur’anic interpretation that created a sense of debate within the umma.  This opinion was not unique for Ma’mun, the Mu’tazilites, or any other extreme rationalists, nor was the uncreated Qur’an a unique ideology of the Shafi’i rationalists or Hanbali traditionalists; it was an evolving debate, where both sides projected a functioning argument based on reason or tradition.  Still, Ma’mun solidified the consequences on supporting the latter ideal.  As stated before, for Ma’mun and his ideological supporters, the creation of the created Qur’an unswervingly reflected the Islamic principle of tawhid or absolute unity of God.  Nawas (1994) explained:

 

The Mu’tazilite argument, which al-Ma’mun also used, is anchored in the assertation about the absolute unity of god: the Qur’an could not be eternal because, if that were the case, and object (the Qur’an) would then share an attribute of God (eternality).  This in turn would violate God’s absolute unity.  The Mu’tazilites therefore concluded that the Qur’an must be created. (p. 625)

 

For, if the Qur’an was uncreated it would be eternal; and if it was eternal it would be outside of God’s eternality.  Thus, since the Qur’an is a thing and God is the creator of all things, the Qur’an must be therefore a created thing.  This concept of tawhid formatted Ma’mun with a rational argument that supported his interpretation and gave it a sense of logic and authority.  Perhaps the true reason Ma’mun integrated the created Qur’an doctrine within his hierarchy of theology was because a created Qur’an suggests the idea that the Qur’an is not the absolute, solidified word of God and can thus be interpreted to fit a specific people or situation.

A created Qur’an imposed the concept that since the Qur’an is not the immutable word of God; subsequently, the created Qur’an was left as a supplemental guideline to something that supersedes it (Watt, 1985, p. 35).  Initially, this was the erudition of the Prophet Muhammad based on his revelations from God.  The umma depended directly on the Prophet as a leader and guide.  This doctrine sufficiently sustained a dependency on a central religious and political leader which coincided, with an ingenious congruency, with Ma’mun’s desire to reestablish his regime and the mantle of caliphate as supreme.  Again as Nawas (1994) has stated, “His was fundamentally a Mu’tazilite platform guided by an abiding conviction that the caliphal institution must survive and that its survival could be assured only by a supreme head with authority that was unquestioned, unlimited, and shared with no one else” (p. 624).

In contrast, an uncreated Qur’an signified the eternality of its origin and significance.  If the Qur’an truly merited itself as eternal, it demonstrated a strict importance in reference to the umma’s heed to the principles it established.  This concept pertained directly to traditional doctrine.  The traditionalists believed the Qur’an to be the literal word of God, yet their interpretation of God’s unity or tawid, in a sense, manifested a different quality because it was eternally part of God’s knowledge or omnipotence.  As Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1994) has so eloquently written:

 

The Qur’an is the tissue out of which the life of a Muslim is woven; its sentences are like threads from which the substance of his soul is knit.  The Prophet was therefore the instrument chosen by God for the revelation of His Word, of His Book of which both the spirit and the letter, the content and the form, are Divine. (p. 30)

 

Since God is eternal and everything within God’s unity is also eternal, and because the Qur’an is the word of God and is part of His divine speech and knowledge, the Qur’an is thus eternal.  Accordingly, nothing pertaining to or incorporated in God’s tawhid is temporal or created because of His eternality.  Furthermore, if the Qur’an is of God and part of his tawhid, it is uncreated. 

Traditional groups and individuals like the Shafi’i school of law, Ahmad Ibn Nasr Ibn Malik, who died a condemned martyr, and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal defied the rationalist doctrine of Ma’mun (Lapidus, 1975, p. 380).  Most of those who defied the rationalist doctrine were either executed or imprisoned as heretics.  Ma’mun attempted to warn further traditionalist schools of kalam that he would not only humiliate the opposition, but also censor their interpretations.  Nawas (1996) again wrote,

 

Unambiguously, then, the findings tell us that the interrogees were muhaddithun of distinction, men highly esteemed for their intellect, as well as their social status and influence—indeed, the [crème de la crème] of Baghdadi hadith-scholarship.  The caliph’s inquisition aimed at more than simply humiliating and muzzling the traditionalists.  This group of luminaries was itself a target, to be sure, but it was also the proxy through which al-Ma’mun sent a loud and clear message that henceforward the business of hadith was under his censorship, and those who transmit or teach it accountable to him. (p. 705)

 

Thus, through the mihna, Ma’mun attempted to control this opposition and solidify his role within the umma and once again fuse the religious and political elements together.

In theory, by consolidating an eclectic version of incorporated theological principles of extreme rationalist kalam and opposing all contradicting doctrine, Ma’mun enabled the ability to redeem his caliphate’s control over the interpretation of hadith.  For Ma’mun, the idea of traditional schools of kalam, who were not commissioned or controlled, secured nothing but the establishment of a destructive element within the umma that would only cause disorder.  This traditional element was definitely a force to be identified and not ignored, for it possessed the ability to nullify his power as caliph.  As established earlier, Ma’mun considered his leadership role to be the inheritor of the prophethood of Muhammad, or at least the religious authority of the Muslim community along with the official responsible for their salvation.  Therefore, since changes in the umma adapted the need for supplementing the Shari’a from the Qur’an with laws constituted from the hadith, Ma’mun desired to have the absolute authority over the interpretation of the hadith.

Yet, even though the plan seemed flawless in theory, in reality, the results manifested a different outcome.  Ma’mun underestimated the influence of those who would oppose his doctrine.  In particular, the inquisition of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal exhibited a rather phenomenal turn of momentum vis-à-vis the reputation of the mihna from the perspective of the umma (Waines, 1995, p. 70).  Amongst the orthodoxy of the traditional schools of kalam, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was the champion.  Patton (1897) illustrated:  

 

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal during his whole career subsequent to the death of the Imam al-Shafi’i (204 A.H.) was the most remarkable figure in the camp of Mohammedan orthodoxy, and during the course of the mihna did more than any other individual to strengthen the resistance of his party to the repressive efforts of the [caliphs] and their officers. (p. 2)

 

During his interrogation, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal refused to condone Ma’mun’s doctrine vindicating the created Qur’an, even under the ominous threat of the sword and incarceration (Nagel, 2000, p. 23).  Ahmad Ibn Hanbal believed adamantly that the Qur’an was uncreated even though the human acts of writing, reading, reciting, and all other acts concerning the preservation of the Qur’an were created (Patton, 1897, p. 35). 

            Even though Ma’mun did not attend the coercion of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, due to either a sense of admiration or malcontent, he anxiously awaited the outcome of the inquisition (Patton, 1897, p. 4).  Thus, when Ahmad Ibn Hanbal ultimately refused to acknowledge the created Qur’an as the only plausible theological concept, Ma’mun demonstrated an intensified intolerance for the traditional schools of kalam.  But it was essential, since Ahmad Ibn Hanbal maintained a prestigious reputation and led an exceptionally large following, to devise a punishment that would not arouse too mush dissension.  Ma’mun decided on imprisonment.

            After a brief prison sentence, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal left prison only to continue his study and interpretation of the Qur’an.  However, the damage was done; Hanbal emerged from the mihna as a venerated religious scholar, saint, and defender of tradition.  Accordingly, after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal died, his students created a school that further circulated his ideology and interpretation (Patton, 1897, p. 4-5).  Nawas (1994) clarified the following concerning the Hanbali school of law, “In the following century the new movement took the form of the form of the Hanbali school of law.  The teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal were codified to become the basis of a new corpus of law and traditions, a new school in which religious thinkers adhered to the principles of the master and expounded them” (p. 622).  

 

Conclusion

 

The mihna demonstrated a tremendous development regarding the communal and sectarian elements within the umma during the ninth century.  After the mihna concluded, fifteen years later in 848, the popular local religious movement continued to amplify results with the scholarly and religious traditions of study and interpretation.  The populace concerned more about the local religious interpretations of kalam and the schools of law rather than any ruling instituted by the caliph.  With the establishment of the Hanbali school of theology and law, the evolution of authoritative power changed hands completely in favor of the local element of scholars or ulama; therefore divisions amongst the umma manifested a more prevalent nature with the opportunity to elect which schools of kalam and fiqh to follow.  Within the Hanbalis in particular, the belief of militant uprisings against any unrighteous leader, including the caliph, deemed a major absolution to the caliph’s central authority in secular government.  As Lapidus (1975) articulated, “Henceforth, the caliphate was no longer the sole identifying symbol or the sole organizing institution, even for those Muslims who had been most closely identified with it” (p. 383).     

Thus in a paradoxical result, since Ma’mun initiated the mihna not only to oppose heterogeneous groups of ulama in interpreting hadith and establishing there schools of kalam and fiqh, but to also attempt the reconfiguration of the caliphate and once again reestablish a centralized authority within the government, in actuality, the mihna, even though it lasted beyond the inquisition of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, created a  more dependant reliability based on the merit of the separate schools of kalam and fiqh, both in rational and traditional aspects.  In other words, the mihna further enabled the separation of religious authority outside of the realm of the caliphate and towards the local religious authority of the ulama.

In hindsight, the initial implications of the institution of the mihna, as influenced specifically by rational groups of kalam concerning the standard theological question of the created Qur’an, directly involved the implicit assumptions that Ma’mun desired to promote a specific group above the others, namely the Mu’tazilites.  However, this initial paradigm evolved during the course of analysis by additional scholars for the reason that new  evidence confirmed that Ma’mun was rather eclectic in regards to his own theological doctrine; for he selected principles from both the Mu’tazilites, who greatly influenced and supported Ma’mun, and the Shiite idea of imam. 

Thus the development of two newly formulated hypotheses suggested the mihna, first, demonstrated the attempt to recentralize the religious authority within the caliphate by controlling all interpretation of the Qur’an, hadith, and conception of any new laws pertaining to the umma.  This was designed to negate the ulama’s ability to establish diversified rulings and interpretations of religious doctrine on a local level.   Ma’mun vehemently believed that as caliph, he inherited the role of being a deputy to God on the earth, as his messenger, like unto the Prophet.

The second hypothesis consisted that the establishment of the mihna was presented to the umma to oppose the traditional element of ulama that, of course, refused to advocate the Qur’an as being created.  The mihna was thus designed to discourage and discredit further desire to propagate the traditional schools of ulama and impede their local authority and influence over the umma.  Ma’mun would then have the ability to spread his authority and centralized political power as caliph, which would legitimize his rule. 

However, in actuality, the two hypotheses mesh more as an interlocking plot to reconfirm and strengthen the absolute, centralized authority of the caliph by sufficiently discrediting the opposition to the point of disbandment, to insure the holding of all religious and political power, and dissolve any element that may cause future uprisings or dilution of the central caliph.   Thus rather than a fissure of two separate hypotheses, the mihna was a hierarchal scheme which incorporated both hypotheses to ensure success.  Unfortunately for Ma’mun, his plot failed.  The mihna strengthened the local authority of ulama within kalam, as well as with the creation of schools of theology and law, which would become the ultimate authority on religious interpretations of the Qur’an and the hadith, in addition to being the architectural element of the Shari’a.  In contrast, not all scholars have agreed upon the merits of the mihna, since the mihna caused immense tribulations and trouble against Muslims and Islam (Jad’aan, 2000, p. 286).

 

References

 

‘Abd al-Jabbar.  (1997).  Kitab al-usul al-khamsa.  Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol.  Oxford: One World.

 

Ibn Babevayh, Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Ali.  In Hashem Husaini Tehrani (Ed.).  Al-Tawhid.  Qom: Mo’asesa al-Nashr al-Islami.

 

Figueroa, Manuel Ruiz.  (2007).  Califato y religion: Las sorprendentes iniciativas del califa al-Ma’mun (813-833).  Estudios de Asia y Africa, 42 (3), [134], 647-673.

 

Glasse, Cyril.  (2002).  The New Encyclopedia of Islam.  New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

 

Jad’aan, Fahmi.  (2000).  Al-Mihna.  Beyrut: Mo’ssasa al-Arabi al-Dorasat val Nashr.

 Ibn Khalakan, Shams al-Din Ahmad.  In Ehsan Abbas (Ed.).  Vafiat al-A’ayan va Anba’Abna’ al-Zaman, (Vol. 6).  Beyrut: Dar al-Thaghafa.

 

Lapidus, Ira M.  (1975).  The separation of state and religion in the development of early Islamic society.  International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (4), 363-385.

Madelung, Wilfred.  (1985).  The origins of the controversy concerning the creation of the Koran.  Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam.  London: Variorum Reprints.

 

Mas’udi, Ali ibn Husain.  (1970).  In Abolghasem Payandeh (Ed.).  Al-Tanbih val Ashraf.  Tehran.

Melchert, Christopher.  (1997).  The adversaries of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.  Arabica, 44 (2), 234-253.

 Ibn al-Morteza, Ahmad ibn Yahya.  (1988).  Tbaghat al-Mu’tazila.  Beyrut: Dar al-Jil.

Nagel, Tilman.  (2000).  The History of Islamic Theology: From Muhammad to the Present.  (Thomas Thornton, Trans.).  Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein.  (1994).  Ideals and Realities of Islam.  Chicago: ABC International Group, Inc.

Nasution, Harun.  (1997).  Kaum Mu’tazilah dan pandangan rasionalanya (The Mu’tazila and rational philosophy).  Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol.  Oxford: Oneworld.

Nawas, John A.  (1996).  The mihna of 218 A.H. /833 A.D. revisited: an empirical study.  Journal of the American Oriental Society, 116 (4), 698-708.

Nawas, John A.  (1994).  A reexamination of three current explanations for al-Mamun’s introduction of the mihna.  International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (4), 615-629.

Patton, Walter Melville.  (1897).  Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna.  Ruprecht Karls Universitat of Heidelberg: Librairie et Imprimerie.  

Peters, J.R.T.M.  (1976).  God’s Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Mu’tazili Qadi l-Qudat Abu al-Hasan ‘Abd Al-Jabbar bin Ahmad Al-Hamadani.  Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Qara’i, ‘Ali Quli (Trans.).  (2006).  Al-Qur’an.  Clarksville: Khatoons Inc.

Safva, Ahmad Zaki.  (1937).  In Mostafa Halabi (Ed.).  Jamhara Rasa’el al-Arab (Vol. 3).  Cairo: N.P.

Shahrestani, Abd al-Karim.  (1979).  In Mostafa Halabi (Ed.).  Al Melal val Nehal (Vol.1).  Cairo: N.P.

Sourdel, Dominique.  (1962).  La politique du calife Abbasid al-Ma’mun.  Revue des Estudes Islamiques, 30, 27-48.

Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir.  (1996).  In Abolghasem Payandeh (Ed.).  Tarikh al-Rosol va al-Moluk (Vol. 13).  Tehran: Asator.

Ibn Tayfur, Ahmad ibn Tahir.  (1987).  Ketab Baghdad.  Cairo: Dar al-Nehzat al-Arabiah.

Waines, David.   (1995).  An Introduction to Islam.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Watt, W. Montgomery.  (1985).  Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim.  (1997).  The caliphs, the ulama, and the law: defining the role and function of the caliph in the early ‘Abbasid period.  Islamic Law and Society, 4 (1), 1-36.

2. The Ottoman-French Connection: The Disintegration of Pax Ottomanica in the Napoleonic Era 

 

           

To initiate amicable relations with an alliance within a milieu of adversaries may seem rather difficult.  However, to maintain trust and confidence within that particular relationship could perhaps seem somewhat impossible, especially when one specific member of the alliance gradually manifests a decline in potency.  Thus the relationship disintegrates, due to the immense pressure, and eventually evolves into a vast schism and vehement distrust.  This exact paradigm marked the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica.[1]

            Since the unification of the Spanish and Austria-Hungarian thrones, known as the Hapsburg Empire or the Holy Roman Empire, France and the Ottoman Empire constructed a juxtaposed alliance to contest the rising threat with military, economic, and social collaborations.  Nevertheless, the pax ottomanica did not sustain indefinitely throughout the French and Ottoman connection, nor did the relationship sustain mutual trust after the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in the summer of 1798.  Therefore even though the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica sustained an amicable non-inter-combatant alliance that instituted military, social, and economic collaborations for almost three centuries, the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 instigated disintegration within the dynamics of the relationship as well as suspicion and infidelity.

 

Pre-Napoleonic Era: The Creation of the Pax Ottomanica

 

            After the Electors proclaimed Charles V of the Hapsburg Empire as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1521 and Francis I of France was imprisoned for defiance in 1525, the French sought assistance from the Ottoman Empire which was the only power deemed formidable enough to defy the Hapsburg Empire and preserve the European states.[2]  This invitation for aide commenced a burgeoning relationship between the two states committed to challenge the Hapsburg claim to world supremacy.  In 1526 the Ottoman state, led by the more than capable Suleyman the Magnificent, inaugurated the military segment of the alliance by advancing the campaign in Hungry, which directly threatened the back door of the Hapsburg Empire.[3] 

The military alliance retained a more formalized rhetoric in response to Genoese Admiral Andrea Dorea’s crusade and capture of Tunis in July of 1535.  With the threat of this new crusade and prominence of Admiral Dorea, the French and Ottomans realized that a joint effort against their adversaries was most beneficial.[4]  Furthermore, in 1536, the French-Ottoman joint military coalition advanced into Italy; the Ottomans advanced from the south by sea as the French upheld simultaneous pressure from the north by land.  However, the French withdrew their military forces due to significant religious influence propagated directly from the papal institution.[5]  Yet even though Suleyman the Magnificent felt somewhat betrayed, the French mended any damage sustained by warning Suleyman of an upcoming Christian crusade against the Muslims in 1542.[6] 

After the redemption of the French in the Ottoman perspective, the military relations continued to flourish with the ratification of an official treaty signed on the 1^st of August, 1547.  This treaty constituted the realization that the French alliance was an extremely vital concession.  Scholar Halil Inalcik states, “The French alliance was the cornerstone of Ottoman policy in Europe.”[7]  In other words, France acted as a vital conduit to Europe, as well as played a significant role in maintaining the contemporary status-quo and preventing Hapsburg domination in Europe.

While the Franco-Ottoman military partnership continued to cultivate, the initiation of economic concessions also rendered a more lucrative proliferation.  In February of 1536, the first unofficial Franco-Ottoman trade agreement was reached and the paradigm for the particular capitulations was patterned after preceding arrangements with Venice and Genoa.[8]  The capitulations for the French offered an unreserved freedom to travel within the Eastern Mediterranean as well as immense benefits concerning trade in Ottoman ports.

Specifically, the Ottoman capitulations granted France entrance into the Ottoman market which created a sense of commercial autonomy within the state.  Within these capitulations, the French established a Frankish-like millet milieu governed by the rule of French ambassadors and representatives, by whom, operated French courts upheld by French law, which were all within the Ottoman state.  In addition, customs rates were calculated at an especially minute rate to further indemnify trade and provide sufficient monetary gain.[9]  The Franco-Ottoman capitulations were officially ratified, by the sultan and the Sublime Porte, as legal and authentic on the 18^th of October, 1569.[10] 

This economic agreement further solidified the Ottoman foreign policy in regards to France being the cornerstone and window to the west.[11]  Moreover, since the French were basically the first official state to receive official capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, France fortified the most significant economic dependence as well as a pervasive influence in Ottoman commerce, especially pertaining to Egypt.[12]    

Finally, within the culminating affects of such a long term partnership, the Franco-Ottoman alliance obviously benefited socially as well as militarily and economically.  In terms of social influence, the secular modernity of the French reflected a romantic mystique and a lucid aspiration to modernize or reform one’s state rather than diminish continually in decline.  Initially, the Ottoman military capacity masked an internal decline.  Albeit, the wake of western modernity ameliorated European military might to such a significant advantage, the apparent Ottoman decline was no longer able to hide behind the façade of their gilded military.[13]  Furthermore, it was absolutely essential to initiate some kind of change or reform to meet the demands of a more modern world and to oppose the decline, particularly regarding the systematic, militaristic, and economic set backs vis-à-vis the Ottoman state which apparently originated this decline.

Consequently, the Ottoman state sought out their French alliance to again assist them in this improvement project.  One of the most significant proponents of Ottoman reform was the Sultan Selim III.  Even before Selim was sultan, and still as a resident of the palace kafes, Selim corresponded with Louis XVI of France, from whom, offered patronage and advice to the fledgling leader.[14]  Selim, accordingly, initiated reforms within the Ottoman state based on a western paradigm of thought to save his state from internal and external threats.[15] 

Although many of Selim’s reforms encompassed around his Nizam-I Cedid army, since French instructors were mainly used to train the troops within this new institution and demonstrate the pattern for military reforms, the French language as well as French intellectualism lingered within the Ottoman state.[16]  This remained a reoccurring facet within Ottoman reforms and intellectual movements, especially concerning the education of the Ottoman academics in both the Ottoman state and France, as well as the pervasive influence of the French Revolution of 1789. 

Hence, not only did the French Revolution cast a negative shadow in regards to the nationalistic ideologies of non-Muslim uprisings, such as the Greek independence movement, it also affected the Muslim conservative religious effort, namely the ulema,  to also look at French enlightenment with disdain.[17]  However the French Revolution greatly inspired a modern, secular, intellectual response responsible for the modernization of a Turkish state, Turkish nationalism, and the Turkish education system, namely sponsored by the Young Ottomans as well as the Young Turks.[18]  Thus it is apparent that the Franco-Ottoman alliance also significantly influenced the social status of the Ottoman state.   

With the establishment of pax ottomanica, the Franco-Ottoman alliance cultivated a solidified relationship of trust and dependence in a collaborated effort to sustain military, economic, and social support in order to prosper.  This rapport, however, extensively shifted as a result of Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and the continued betrayal of Ottoman confidence.[19]  Notwithstanding, it is easy to understand within the historical analysis of Napoleon’s life, as well as the steady decline of the coined “sick man of Europe,” why Napoleon and France sought diplomacy with more prominent allies at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.  

 

The Disintegration of the Pax Ottomanica during the Napoleonic Era  

 

After the French Revolution and before Napoleon Bonaparte instituted his reign as emperor, the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica alliance experienced an immense strain with the expedition into Egypt by Napoleon as a means to rout the British’s, who were the last power left from the War of the First Coalition, commercial enterprise and trade in the Ottoman state and India.  However, not only was Egypt a means to disrupt the economic stability and concessions of Britain, it seemed that Napoleon preserved an intrinsic fascination with the enchantment of the East, as well as being a keystone in which he could possibly secure a legacy in history.  Also, Napoleon used his expedition into Egypt as an altruistic contrivance to overcome Mamluk control and appear as if the French maintained Ottoman interests as an ally.  Nonetheless, it was Napoleon’s malcontent and disparagement of the Ottoman regime that changed French-Ottoman relations and shifted the Ottoman confidence from trust to suspicion.

As Selim the Grim expanded Ottoman territory victory after victory, campaign after campaign, the gazi Sultan noticed the prolific benefits of Egypt.  Egypt boasted a prominent economy in regards to trade and agriculture as well as a well fortified location and proximity to the Hijaz which hosted the center of Islam and its two most holy sites.[20]  Yet Egypt was controlled by the Mamluk regime, which descended from medieval elite warriors originating from the Caucasus Mountains.  The Mamluks first appeared in Egypt in 1230 and quickly retained suzerainty in 1252 after assassinating Sultan Ashraf Moussa.[21]  The Mamluk authority in Egypt remained absolute until Selim the Grim seized Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz in 1517 and catapulted Ottoman control over both the resources and provincial administration.[22] 

Nevertheless, the Mamluks still maintained a significant role in Egypt after the conquest and incorporation by the Ottomans.  For as the Ottoman central government continued to weaken, the remaining Mamluk Beys retained administrative positions which included ayans as well as ciftliks.  As the provincial Ottoman leadership, mainly held by the defterdar and qadis, began to loosen in Egypt, the Mamluk Beys consolidated further control over the province by administering iltizams or tax farming.[23]  The iltizams significantly provided control of finances to promote Mamluk affluence and power in Egypt by the time of Napoleon’s expedition.[24]  Napoleon used the Mamluk eminence to justify his expedition into Egypt with the Porte.

For Napoleon, the East (the Near East, from Egypt to India) always conceded an essence of mystical enchantment.  As a young man, Napoleon received a fundamental education of the classics and gravitated towards the heroic military conquests of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar.[25]  These military leaders of legend lent a grand paradigm of aspiration for Napoleon.  Thus the East not only offered the opportunity to seek glory, it also founded Napoleon’s romantic conception to leave his legacy, an empire, in the pages of history.[26]  It is quite Ironic to note that the Nazis regime, during the 1930’s and 1940’s, had a similar aspiration with their desire to create the Third Reich or empire following the original two empires of Alexander and Caesar.  Napoleon instigated the Egyptian expedition on his own monetary funds and departed from Camp Formio to entertain his fantastic aspirations.  Thus, as Alexander the Great started his campaign in Egypt, so did Napoleon.

It seemed that all forces of nature were pulling Napoleon to the East and Egypt.  Napoleon’s background and aspirations all enveloped in the mystique of the East, as if beckoning him to entertain all desires to etch his name into the fabric of history.  In addition, Egypt appeared profitable for the reaping of the French Republic.  Primarily, Egypt was a perfect staging point to gain advantage in the continuing Anglo-Franco aggression.

Napoleon formulated two possible strategic advantages which merited from the control of Egypt.  First, France could establish a lucrative colony along the Nile River Delta which would provide benefits from trade, Mediterranean and Red Sea ports, and resources from colonialism.  However, most importantly, Egypt could be used as a strategic stronghold in deposing Britain and her colonies.  Britain’s commercial strength exhibited a great weakness in Egypt.  Thus after establishing a stronghold in Egypt, France could monopolize the trading routes by both land and sea.  The French saw this advantage as an opportunity to block communication between Britain and her colonies and hinder British commerce.  Moreover, Egypt yet again demonstrated its opportune geography as a perfect staging point to launch direct assaults on India, which was Britain’s most profitable colony.[27]

Napoleon perfectly depicts, in his own words, the benefits of an Egyptian expedition in a letter to his Soldiers on the 2^nd of July, 1798.  Using classical rhetoric and the paradigm of both Alexander and the Roman legions, Napoleon instigates resolve amongst his men with claims that manifest destiny will favor the French mission to defeat the Mamluk Beys and smite a crucial blow to Britain.[28]  Napoleon successfully landed at Alexandria, the city founded by his hero Alexander the Great, on the 1^st of July, 1798.  Yet, the Mamluks responded with a counteroffensive that culminated at the Battle of the Pyramids on the 21^st of that same month.  Even though the Mamluk forces battled with a significantly larger force, they were no match for the military might of the French as well as the military brilliance of Napoleon.  Consequently, the French suffered only nine fatalities with one hundred wounded, while over sixteen hundred Mamluks soldiers perished.[29] 

With this victory, as previously mentioned, Napoleon again writes that the French sought revenge on the Mamluks for the many humiliations prompted upon French merchants, as well as for the defense of Islam and to assist the sultan in retaining control over the Egyptian province.[30]  Napoleon’s letter may have pacified the Egyptians, but the French invasion only infuriated the Ottoman regime and destroyed the contemporary Franco-Ottoman relations.  On the 9^th of September, 1798, the Porte declared war and jihad against their former allies.[31] 

As Napoleon quickly arose to power with the defeat of the Mamluks and also from controlling former Mamluk tax farms to finance his eastern campaign, Napoleon and his cohorts soon experienced many hardships inherent with the East.  On the 1^st of August, 1798, Napoleon found himself stranded in the East after the British Admiral Nelson routed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay.  In spite of this misfortune and as he followed in the footsteps of his hero Alexander, Napoleon and his forces continued on with the Eastern expedition which further prolonged their suffering.  After many hardships, including disease and hunger due to a poor supply line, Napoleon failed to seize Acre, which Alexander had besieged and won twenty-two centuries earlier, and was forced to return to France to battle the Second Coalition coordinated by Austria, Britain, Russia and the Ottoman Empire.[32]      

The Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica ruptured for the first time since its initial composition.  The Ottomans continued with anti-Napoleon and anti-French sentiments by first creating an alliance between Muslim and Christian powers in 1799 and then by signing the Treaty of Defensive Alliance of September of 1805 with Russia and Britain.[33]  This permitted Russian warships passage within the Turkish Straits.  This alliance was formulated strictly to combat the rising success of Napoleon and France, except it required an unfamiliar allegiance between two natural enemies, Russia and the Ottomans.  The synthetic relationship imposed between Russia and the Ottoman state soon fell as a result of French diplomacy.  Since Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt, somehow, Selim III reconciled differences with Napoleon and condoned the betrayal of their allegiance.  For Selim still admired France and their alliance still warranted a natural connection.  Thus in 1806, Selim recognized Napoleon as the rightful Emperor of France and withdrew from their previous alliance with Russia and Britain.[34]  This turn of events, of course, ignited Russian and British indignation, but it was Selim who declared war on Russia on the 27^th of December, 1806.  Still, the Russian military was far superior to that of the Ottomans and rapidly advanced into Bucharest, Wallachia, Bessarabia and even the mouth of the Dardanelles in the early months of 1807.  Unfortunately for the Ottoman state, the paucity of French reinforcements left the Ottomans to fend for themselves.[35]

The year 1807 again manifested misfortune for the Ottomans, but this time the origins were due to both internal and external strife.  The ayans, ulema, and janissary corps toppled Selim in an orchestrated coup which raised Mustafa IV to sultan and disposed of the Nizam-I Cedid.  Mustafa maintained Franco-Ottoman relations and depended significantly on their formidable ally with the utmost confidence.  However, this confidence was again misplaced.  Napoleon again sought to take advantage of his alliance with the Ottoman state to secure an even more profitable alliance.  Napoleon first met and signed the Treaty of Finkenstein, in May of 1807, with Iran, ensuring support for an Iranian campaign to reconquer the Caucasus as well as India.[36]  Additionally, Napoleon and Alexander I met in the German town of Tilsit on the 7^th of July, 1807, to discuss the annexation of Ottoman territories, since the Ottoman military was so inefficient and impotent to defend them.  After a reconciliation regarding the Ottoman territories was reached between France and Russia, France persuaded the Ottoman state to sign an armistice with their infamous Russian adversary.  Yet the armistice never secured Russia’s commitment, thus confirming French perfidy and betrayal.[37]       

The Ottoman government had no choice but to plead with Britain to save them from certain annihilation, since they now found themselves shoved between two enemies.  The British and Ottomans signed the Dardanelles Treaty of Peace on the 5^th of January, 1809.  Again Napoleon sought to reform the pax ottomanica with the recently ascended sultan, Mahmud II, but trust and confidence in Napoleon and France had completely disintegrated.  Thus, instead of a final renewal of a once prosperous relationship, where France acted as a cornerstone for the Ottoman foreign policy vis-à-vis the west, the Ottoman state realized that they would never fully trust France again.  Consequently, the Ottoman Porte signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Russia on the 28^th of May, 1812.[38]  

 

Post Napoleonic Era and Pseudo Franco-Ottoman Relations  

 

After the defeat of Napoleon and his banishment to first the Island of Elba and then to the Island of St. Helena, the world began to repair and reorganize that which Napoleon’s so-called legacy left in shambles.  The Congress of Vienna was the world’s attempt to mend all that was broken.  Napoleon had left the continent in disarray which left nations, especially France [initially], to adopt anti-nationalistic sentiments to avoid further wars.[39]  As a result, one of the most orchestrated policies that engendered from the Congress of Vienna of 1815 was the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, which survived virtually unscathed, as the essential key in the European status-quo.[40]  Accordingly, the Ottomans were initiated in the Concert of Europe and were finally able, for a time, to focus on internal elements of the Ottoman government.

Yet, even though France and the Ottomans were united within the Concert of Europe and bound by the Congress of Vienna, still the mistrust resonated from Napoleon’s betrayals.  A pseudo alliance was thus created between the French and Ottomans where dissension prevailed whenever justified.  The Ottoman’s still used France as link to western modernity, but France never retained the loyalty and trust of the Ottoman state.  France openly participated in supporting Muhammad ‘Ali’s reform policies which assisted Egypt in ameliorating their education system as well as modernizing their military and economy, which in time, opposed the Ottoman sovereignty.[41]  Also, France participated in a territorial squabble with the Ottoman state in regards to the annexation of Algeria in 1830.[42]  Therefore, the relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire was never repaired and continued to disintegrate over time until they found themselves once again as adversaries in World War I.    

 In closing, it is safe to argue that the decision for Napoleon to ultimately betray the Franco-Ottoman pax ottomanica, which had flourished for almost three preceding centuries, was the direct consequence of the steady decline of the Ottoman state and lack of military prowess.  If the Ottoman state had maintained its efficiency as during the times of Suleyman the Magnificent, Napoleon would have greatly benefited from the Franco-Ottoman alliance because of geographical and ideological advantages.  Yet since the Ottoman inefficiency confirmed its weakened state, Napoleon betrayed an ever so solid pax ottomanica connection which led to the disintegration of Franco-Ottoman confidence and trust.

Bibliography

 

 

Badie, Bertrand.  “The Impact of the French Revolution on Muslim Societies: Evidence and Ambiguities.”  International Social Science Journal, February 1989.  (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 5-16.

 

Hanna, Nelly.  Edited by Irene A. Bierman.  “Ottoman Egypt and the French Expedition: Some Long-Term Trends.” Napoleon in Egypt.  United Kingdom: Garnet Publishing Limited, 2003. 

 

Herold, J. Christopher.  Bonaparte in Egypt.  New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962.

 

Hess, Andrew C.  “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War.”  International Journal of Middle East Studies, January 1973.  (Vol. 4 Issue 1), 55-76.

 

Inalcik, Halil.  The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600.  London, Phoenix Press, 1973.

 

Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh.  Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

Kolla, Edward James.  “Not So Criminal: New Understandings of Napoleon’s Foreign Policy in the East.”  French Historical Studies, Spring 2007.  (Vol. 30 Issue 2), 175-201.

 

Lewis, Bernard.  The Emergence of Modern Turkey.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

 

Mardin, Serif.  “The Influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire.”  International Social Science Journal, February 1989.  (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 17-31.

 

Moiret, Captain Joseph-Marie.  Translated and edited by Rosemary Brindle.  Memoirs of Napoleon’s Egyptian Expedition, 1798-1801.  London: Grenhill Books, 2001.

 

Shaw, Stanford J.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, Volume 1.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

 

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, Vol. 2.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

 

Straus, Hannah Alice.  The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1949.

---

[1] Nelly Hanna, “Ottoman Egypt and the French Expedition: Some Long-Term Trends,” Napoleon in Egypt, (United Kingdom: Garnet Publishing Limited, 2003), 11.   Pax ottomanica referenced the Franco-Ottoman treaty signed 1 August 1547; lasted until Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt in 1798.

 

[2] Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London: Phoenix Press, 1973), 35.

[3] Inalcik, 35.

[4] Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, Vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 97.

[5] Shaw, Vol.1, 98-99.

[6] Shaw, Vol. 1, 102.

[7] Inalcik, 37.

[8] Shaw, Vol. 1, 97.

[9] Shaw, Vol. 1, 97.

[10] Inalcik, 137.

[11] Inalcik, 137.

[12] J. Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 10.

[13] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 56.

[14] Lewis, 56.

[15] Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 9.

[16] Lewis, 57.

[17] Serif Mardin, “The Influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire,” International Social Science Journal, February 1989, (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 17.

[18] Bertrand Badie, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Muslim Societies: Evidence and Ambiguities,” International Social Science Journal, February 1989, (Vol. 41 Issue 1), 11.

[19] Mardin, 17.

[20] Andrew C. Hess, “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, January 1973, (Vol. 4 Issue 1), 55.

[21] Herold, 7.

[22] Hess, 55.

[23] Hanna, 6-7.

[24] Hanna, 7.

[25] Edward James Kolla, “Not So Criminal: New Understandings of Napoleon’s Foreign Policy in the East,” French Historical Studies, Spring 2007, (Vol. 30 Issue 2), 177.

[26] Kolla, 179.

[27] Kolla, 182-184.

[28] Captain Joseph-Marie Moiret, translated and edited by Rosemary Brindle, Memoirs of Napoleon’s Egyptian Expedition, 1798-1801, (London: Grenhill Books, 2001), 39.

[29] Moiret, 55.

[30] Moiret, 43.

[31] Kolla, 186.

[32] Kolla, 185 and 188

[33] Karsh, 11.

[34] Karsh, 12.

[35] Karsh, 13.

[36] Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 16.

[37] Karsh, 14-15.

[38] Karsh, 15-17.

[39] Hannah Alice Straus, The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 151.

[40] Karsh, 17.

[41] Hanna, 10-11.

[42] Hanna, 11.

 

 

3. The Domestic Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II: Ottoman Ambitions to Ascendancy

 

During the nascent years of sovereignty, the Ottoman state ascended to greatness on wings of merit established by the charismatic leadership of a dynastic sultanate, as well as the gazi attitude of holy warriors defending the faith and establishing a noble Muslim state.  Albeit, after the rule of Suleyman the Magnificent, the Ottoman zenith diminished into a gradual decline in authoritative control due to the errant lack of charismatic leadership of the sultanate regarding their training, lack of fratricide, and primogeniture ascendancy, as well as the inherent stagnation and  evanescent discipline that once  defined the military might of the janissary corps.[1]  Thus, the prestige of the Ottoman state slowly evaporated in an evanescent cloud of corruption, inefficiency, and undisciplined institutional weakness making the Ottoman state the “sick man of Europe.” 

However in the nineteenth century CE,  Mahmud II attempted to not only reaffirm the necessity for the modernization of the Ottoman state by reforms to articulate the rebirth of Ottoman formidability, but also to reestablish the arbitrary authority of the central government and role of the sultan as a  charismatic and autocratic leader.  In his attempt to reform and solidify an Ottoman reemergence within the sphere of European power, Mahmud’s reforms never equated immediate success; notwithstanding, the reforms of Mahmud not only changed the institutional structure within the military, society, and bureaucracy which strengthened the central government, state military force, and role of the sultan, but Mahmud’s reforms also initiated the process of modernization which ultimately would lead to the further reformation of the Ottoman state and warrant patriotism within the Ottoman Community.      .

            After Selim III failed in his attempts to reform the Ottoman state and was placed in the kafes, Mahmud realized the authority of the central government, especially regarding the mantle of the sultanate, manifested a deficiency in autocratic arbitration.[2]  The forces of opposition including the institutions of the ulema, ayans, and the janissary corps maintained an unwritten alliance against reforming and modernizing the state.  For the ulema, the preservation of Islamic ideals and tradition preceded any type of innovation or secular modernization.[3]  The ayans desired to maintain their legacy as provincial leaders or aristocracy which required an unreformed, weak central government and its dependency on the ayans for military support during times of war.[4]  As for the janissary corps, reforms regarding the modernization of the military and creation of entirely new military units and institutions, such as Selim’s Nizam-i Cedid, only threatened janissary existence; thus, in the preservation of their professions and traditions, the janissaries refused any type of military reforms and modernizations with ire.[5]  Therefore, for Mahmud to succeed with his reforms, he needed to establish a common bond of allegiance with the ulema and undermine the institutions of the ayans and janissary corps.

            During his training in the kafes and time spent under the influence of Selim, Mahmud developed elements of altruistic reforms to recuperate and modernize the Ottoman state as well as reaffirm the arbitration of the sultan and centralized government.  The time spent with Selim in the kafes proliferated ideas of reforms along with a calculated patience with plans to accomplish these desired reforms in addition to undermine and abolish the institutions of the ayans and janissaries.[6] 

As sultan, Mahmud’s first ploy was to obtain support from the ulema, both in the upper and lower factions, so Mahmud would be able to gain a popular momentum amongst the reaya.  Gaining the ulema’s support, especially in regards to the lower ulema, was essential for his reforms to succeed.  First, Mahmud strengthened his support within the upper ulema by coercion and enticement as well as by appointing his greatest supporters as Seyhulislam in addition to other key positions within the bureaucracy.[7]  All contrary to his ideals were thus discharged.  Also, to gain support from the lower ulema, Mahmud manifested religious, proprietary behavior by becoming visually apparent within public religious society.  Furthermore, Mahmud provided the lower ulema with additional opportunities for employment by building mosques, establishing religious vakifs, and issuing decrees to stabilize religious education within the reaya.[8]  By these actions, Mahmud received the support of both factions of the ulema. 

With the support of the upper and lower ulema, Mahmud furthered their involvement within his policies by establishing a direct attachment between the ulema and his reforms.  Mahmud packaged his reforms as an opportunity to ameliorate the Ottoman state after the ultimate Muslim paradigm of contemporary success, Muhammad Ali of Egypt.[9]  Since the reforms, rhetorically, were patterned after a Muslim paradigm of religion and tradition and not a secular European model, the ulema actively participated in the reforms and assisted also in gaining the support of the populace.  Thus, with the religious element of the ulema and public status-quo all backing the adoption of the “modern Islamic method” of reforms, Mahmud initiated his most prominent reforms which directly involved the modernization of the military.[10]

            Initially, Mahmud reformed the janissary corps not by creating an entirely new army, but by gaining support of many of the elite janissary leaders and evoking the eskenci reforms which created an active military force within the janissary corps.[11]  Mahmud withdrew circa eight thousand janissaries to fill the ranks of the nascent eskenci force.  The eskenci reforms enabled the military to reaffirm discipline and formidability without breaking the previously signed Sened-i Itta’at agreement.[12]  However, the soup cauldrons were overturned and the janissaries revolted immediately after the eskenci reforms in the early morning of June 15, 1826.  With the support of the faithful within the populace as well as the already somewhat modernized Artillery corps, Mahmud quickly routed the janissary revolts and abolished the entire corps, including the new eskenci force, on June 17, 1826.[13] 

With the janissary corps abolished, Mahmud was free to initiate a new modernized military.  The creation of a new army was extremely vital for the Ottoman state because of the precarious environment of the time and lack of military defense and internal policing.  Therefore Mahmud instigated the Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muuhammadiye, or Mansure army, on the very same day as the janissaries were abolished. The regulation of the Mansure army significantly mirrored Selim’s Nizam-i Cedid in most aspects; also the inclusion of an imam or religious patron to every one hundred infantry men further invested ulema support to Mahmud’s new reforms and the Mansure army.[14] 

Mahmud established further military reforms by initiating additional programs vis-à-vis military education that further developed military training, tactics, and discipline, most importantly, pertaining to the military officer corps and their modern officer’s school.[15]  Mahmud not only established new military training schools such as the Mehteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye or School for Military Science, but refurbished existing military training schools such as the engineering schools as well as the palace school within Topkapi palace that trained an elite imperial guard known as the “Trained Imperial Gardeners.”[16]  Mahmud formulated and modernized new military units with a hierarchy of military leadership and organization in addition to the incorporation and reorganization of new and reformed naval, cavalry, infantry, and artillery or topcular units. 

Yet the only merit in which resulted from these reforms was the strengthening of the centralized government including the autocratic position of sultan; for the first test of the Mansure army resulted in an utter defeat to a still superior Russian army.  However, due to the strengthened centralized government, the ayans relinquished great autonomy.[17]  For the ayans innately benefited from a weak centralized government and also a weak central military.  As the centralized government gradually became stronger during the reign of Mahmud as well as the burgeoning Mansure army, the ayans gradually were displaced or defeated with the exception of Muhammad Ali in Egypt.[18]

The Mansure army differed greatly in might and organization from the paradigm of Muhammad Ali’s modern army, due to the short time span in which Mahmud had to commence reforms, train new qualified officers, and amass redoubtable military alumni before he again had to divert his full attention to pressing internal and external threats on multiple Ottoman fronts.  Nevertheless from defeat, Mahmud realized that not only must he reform the military, but it was also necessary to reform all aspects of Ottoman life.[19]

            Mahmud commenced a program of reforms that involved informing and enlightening the Ottoman populace which proved to become the “backbone and model for the Tanzimat reforms.”[20]  Mahmud manifested affluence in publishing books and newspapers in Turkish, as well as other western adaptations to educate and in a sense activate patriotism or social activism concerning the creation of unity within the Ottoman diversity.[21]  Also, Mahmud further westernized the bureaucracy by instituting new modern government positions and introducing three branches within government administration, namely the kalemiye or administration, ilmiye or judicial-religious branch, and most importantly the seyfiye or military branch which further cemented central authority and military significance.[22]

 Adversely, the ulema now found themselves as accessories to not only modernization, but to secular elements of westernization within the Ottoman state; nevertheless, the ulema were bound to agree with the centralized government, especially Mahmud, because they had already prescribed support and deemed Mahmud’s modernization as scrupulous and appropriate religion.  Mahmud further esteemed the sultanate by diminishing the Grand Vizier to a less significant lieutenant-like role as bas vekil or prime minister. Thus without the adversity of the ulema, ayans, and janissaries, Mahmud solidified the authority of the central government and the role of the sultan as the heart of the central government.

            Even though the majority of Mahmud’s reforms proved unsuccessful mainly because of the lack of military leadership and the inability to train efficient military units with alacrity, he initiated the process and idea that the Ottoman state needed to be reformed in order to ameliorate its position within the world society.[23]  Moreover, Mahmud annihilated or nullified all institutions that stood against modernization and westernization.  Consequently, Mahmud was able to once again strengthen the centralized government and, more importantly, the mantle of the Sultan.  In most cases, for reforms to warrant success, it is obligatory to either force reforms by domination or allow time for acceptance to be homogeneous.  In Mahmud’s scenario, time would warrant a sense of success regarding the modernization and westernization of the Ottoman state.

Bibliography

 

Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “Ottoman Attitudes to the Rise of Balkan Nationalism.”  War and Society in East Central Europe.  NEJS 188b assigned reading.  Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839. NEJS 188b assigned reading. Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II.”  NEJS 188b assigned reading.  Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Lewis, Bernard.  The Emergence of Modern Turkey.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

 

Sadat, Deena R. “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century.” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44 No. 3 (September 1972).

 

Shaw, Stanford J.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

 

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

---

[1] Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 110-111.

[2] Avigdor Levy, “Ottoman Attitudes to the Rise of Balkan Nationalism,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 325.

[3] Avigdor Levy, “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 13.

[4] Deena R. Sadat, “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44 No. 3 (September 1972), 346-347.

[5] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 70-71.

[6] Ibid., 77.

[7] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 15.

[8] Ibid., 15.

[9] Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 28-29.

[10] Ibid., 16-17.

[11] Stanford J Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 19.

[12] Shaw, 5.

[13] Ibid., 22.

[14] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 23.

[15] Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 32 and 39.

[16] Shaw, 24.

[17] Karsh, 32.

[18] Sadat, 362-363.

[19] Shaw, 35.

[20] Ibid., 35.

[21] Ibid., 35.

[22] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 31.

[23] “The Officer Corps,” 38-39

 

 

4. Is Russia the greatest threat in the Middle East?

News of the governmental unrest in Syria has seemingly dominated the global newswires for the past two years.  Not only has the military-posed regime validated a discombobulated sense of centralized control and political upheaval, this particular administration, commanded by the incumbent president, Bashar al-Assad, has demonstrated a frequent propensity for wanton violence, which has consistently resulted in the slaughter of thousands of innocents—namely, his own civilian population.  With the recent implication of Assad’s use of sarin gas to quell opposition forces in a Damascus suburb, governments, including the United States and France, have posed the question to ascertain “why” these tactics have been used, and if these tactics have breached the United Nation’s definition of illicit warfare.  Perhaps, the better question is “how” Syria is able to counter this internal insurgency on a military level, and “how” they are able to use and/or produce sarin gas. 

The Obama administration quickly denounced and condemned Assad’s use of chemical weaponry once the US government received DNA evidence confirming the usage of sarin gas in Damascus.  However, President Obama has flirted with the decision for military reprisal more cautiously, and under the guise of “working in concert,” with the US allies in the Middle East (1).  Pro-Obama or not, this was a relatively smart decision.  The Obama regime has done their homework.  The US government analyzed the historical trends of the Middle East.  In particular, the US realized that a fundamentalist regime has often overthrown and replaced their secular predecessor.  This paradigm has exhibited significant chaos, violence, and restrictive milieus in both Iran—with the Iranian revolution—and Egypt.  Thus, this is why the Obama regime has sought support in the US congress, as well as with the internationally community before carrying out an attack on Syria to bolster their stance against chemical warfare.  Ultimately, the US has no motive to attack Syria other than to maintain a precedent, overthrow a tyrannical regime, and protect innocent lives—i.e. Syria has not dominated in oil production or sales similar to other oil-rich countries in that region, nor has Syria exuded a strong allegiance to the U.S [There may be economic incentives for other countries to ban together to oust Assad, but it is dubious to think the US can benefit from those particular incentives.](2).

Conversely, Russia has adamantly disputed the use of sarin gas in Syria—at least by the hands of Assad’s regime.  In fact, just recently, Russia issued a statement condemning the US/Franco theory of events, in addition to the Western forensic investigations.  According to their “Russian” forensic investigation, and due to the crude chemical strain of the sarin gas that was used, coupled with the ineffective delivery system of the attack, the Russian government deduced the Syrian insurgency as culpable for the sarin attack rather than Assad’s regime(3).  Nevertheless, Russian motives have been quite questionable in their support of Assad.  Moreover, Russia has bolstered Assad politically on numerous occasions when the Western powers or the UN have attempted to instigate change or sanctions in Syria.

Additionally, though, Russia has invested far more in Assad than just their political allegiance.  Russia has been illegally selling arms to Syria despite the many economic sanctions initiated by the UN, EU, Turkey, US, and Arab League.  Russia has made over a billion dollars of revenue on these illegal arms contracts:

"The Russian defense industry source, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Assad had started in recent months paying off a nearly $1-billion contract for four S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems and another $550 million order for 36 YAK-130 trainer fighter planes (4)."

Furthermore, Russia has also been ousted as propagating several trades of S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to the country of Iran despite sanctions.  Russia has maintained their membership as part of the UN Security Council, but has continually feigned their involvement, and essentially, sabotaged political, military, and economic stability by means of illegal arms deals throughout the Middle East.  The questions that have been seemingly forgotten: 1). How often has Russia been selling arms to Syria? 2) What types of arms has Russia been selling to Syria?  Perhaps, if these questions are answered, the world will find out why Russia has been so adamant in denying Assad’s involvement in the chemical attacks on the Syrian population.

1)      http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57600900/u.s-has-firm-evidence-sarin-gas-was-used-in-syria-chemical-weapons-attack-sec-kerry-says/

2)      https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html

3)      http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/world/middleeast/russia-says-study-suggests-syria-rebels-used-sarin.html?_r=0

4)      http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/syria-pays-for-russian-arms-to-boost-ties-with-moscow/485308.html

 

 

 

 

5. A Lack of Religious Education for Muslims Continues to Spawn Acts of Terror

 

Acts of terrorism at the hands of religious extremists continue to maintain prominence in the headlines of international news.  Whether the headline articulates a new surge of attacks in Somalia, Yemen, or even Iraq, puritanical extremists such as the Taliban and al-Qaida disseminate their pervasive messages to convince traditional Muslims to heed their call to arms.  These terrorist groups interpret Islamic law to propagate their religious decrees (fatwa), accompanied by verses of the Qur’an, to orchestrate a cacophony of violence and terror amongst their own people and within their own religious culture to garner power in the Middle East.  However, these acts of violence do not necessarily emanate from the establishment and practice of Islamic Law; but rather, many of these issues are a direct result of Muslims losing a sense of their own religion.  In other words, Muslims follow these fundamentalist leaders because their foundation in Islamic doctrine and theology has waned beyond the point of knowing their own traditions and the laws of their religion.

Historically, during the early years of the 19^th century, political leaders of the Ottoman Empire decided to reform education and emphasize western sciences and languages in lieu of the traditional religious schools that taught doctrine, faith, and theology.  As a result, students slowly began to stop prescribing to the Islamic schools of law (Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali, and Hanafi) and theology (Hanbali, Asharite, Maturidis, and Mutazilites), which diminished the students’ cultural and religious awareness.  Furthermore, Muslims relied more on their local religious leaders, rather than cultivating religious study amongst themselves.  Many of the traditional religious sciences such as kalam (theology), Sufism, and philosophy were displaced and even considered as heretical.

The lack of the religious education among Muslims has deteriorated the understanding of their own religion.  Consequently, fundamentalist leaders are using ignorance to gain support and momentum for their militancy.  These leaders, such as the former al-Qaida leader, Osama Bin Laden, interpret the Qur’an, hadith, and Islamic laws (faqiq) to instill terror in society, and ultimately, manipulate devoted believers by the promise of deliverance justice. 

In preceding times, the leaders of the Muslim communities needed to spend countless hours in study before they were able to decree on any type of religious ruling.  These leaders, known as judges (qadi) and law officials (mufti), looked at Islamic sources and derived adaptations, interpretations, or contemporaneous rulings by means of contextual analysis and the essential merit.  In contrast, today, fundamentalist leaders issue edicts without manifesting the necessary qualifications to maintain legal validity.  However, because the religious education of Muslims has decreased as previously discussed, fundamentalist leaders gain followers with their religious interpretations without the proper validation.

Fundamentalist groups continually amass followers by means of trepidation and unqualified manipulation of religious dogma.  Accordingly, many Muslim societies are becoming more endocentric, which is only causing further dependency upon these fundamentalist leaders.  Therefore, the lack of a religious education has ultimately caused a disparity in the religious understanding of Muslims, leaving room for puritanical literalists to manipulate and warp the comprehension of Islamic principles and doctrines.

Book Review:

 

All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror,

by Stephen Kinzer.  New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003.

 

                The book, All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, written by Stephen Kinzer, provides a paradigm historical account of the rudimentary foundations of negative relations involving western powers vis-à-vis Iranian political security.  This book, which somewhat resembles a Robert Ludlum espionage thriller, not only explains the rise of a new Iranian, nationalistic, democratic phenomenon under the utopian idealistic hand of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh during the early 1950’s CE, but also paints a relevant image of the paranoid schizophrenia which plagued the political standoff between the eastern communist block and western democracy during the cold war.  For Stephen Kinzer, the 1953 coup d’état in Iran not only ushered in the idea of western support for tyrannical regimes to supplement commerce concessions of western interest, but the coup also initiated catastrophic consequences  which frequented CIA insurrections of dissonance as well as a catalyst for puritanical literalists groups who today flourish under the more colloquially terminology as terrorists.  Thus, due to coup of 1953, relations between the United States and Iran have completely created a polar, abhorrent schism of political suspicion and enmity.

                According to Kinzer, the reason for the Iranian coup of 1953 revolved fundamentally on the private Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s rights to Iranian oil intertwined with a red scare to stir American involvement.  For most Americans, the ideal of imperialism became stagnant, in a sense, during post-revolutionary life; imperialism later manifested an oppressive malevolent aura following Wilson’s condemnations of the western propensity for colonization during the Treaty of Versailles.  However, imperialism, rearing its most oppressive head, still benefited Great Britain as an exceptional concession, within Iran, during the first five decades of the twentieth century.  Kinzer illustrates, in his book, the detrimental decadence of British imperialism, regarding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as the key prominent element for the Iranian coup of 1953.

                During the first half of the twentieth century, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company legally signed concession agreements with both Nasir al-Din Shah of the Qajar dynasty, as well as Reza Khan or Reza Shah in 1933.  However, after the death of Reza Shah and succession of his son Muhammad Reza Shah, the National Front movement within the Majlis or parliament, led by Mossadegh, sought for a more nationalist approach to Iranian sovereignty, foreign imperialism, and economic prosperity.  Consequently, as Mossadegh was elected Prime Minister, thus manifesting the majority of political power and public support within Iran, the Iranian nationalistic movement rendered all Iranian concessions a national commodity.  Unfortunately, for Great Britain, as Kinzer describes, this also meant the oil concessions.

                Great Britain refused to dismiss what they referred to as their “private property” in Iran.  However, the nationalistic element within the Majlis continued to dismiss supplemental offers from Anglo-Iranian Board of Directors because of their unwillingness to open their audit ledgers to Iranian officials and lack of respect and consideration for employee rights and benefits.  The United Nations, including the United States and President Harry Truman, all tried to mend relations and erect a compromise between Great Britain and Iran, but to no avail.  For even the World Court suspended the British claim to the oil concessions indefinitely in 1952.  Great Britain refused to amend their contract, which was notarized by Reza Shah in 1933, and Iran refused to allow the British to operate their oil concession within the country.  Great Britain initiated clandestine operations, namely perfidious psychological warfare attributed to the British Secret Intelligence Services or MI6, within Iran to thwart and manipulate Iranian economic and social stability, as well as intimidation tactics in regards to embargos and sanctions by Her Majesties Navy within the Persian Gulf.  However, these scare tactics only resulted in the suspension of all diplomatic relations between Iran and the British, which left the British in search for an ally, with access to Iran, to aide their cause.

                Initially, according to Kinzer, the relationship with Iran and the United States was rather positive, especially pertaining to the Truman administration and Mossadegh himself.  In fact, Truman, as Kinzer portrays, supported Iran and Mossadegh in their desire for the nationalization of Iran and their concessions including the oil dispute and Great Britain.[1]  Truman felt that the British were just too prideful to admit their faults and compromise a new contractual agreement; however, Truman also had to deny financial aid to Iran due to this western alliance.  The standoff between the British and Iran would not be resolved and stood stagnant by Truman’s refusal to take sides.  However, the tides turned with the re-election of Winston Churchill and election of President Dwight Eisenhower.

                Eisenhower’s election to the American presidency fashioned an ecstatic reception amongst covert operations within the British government because of his adamant stand against communism.  Senior agent, Christopher Montague Woodhouse appealed directly to the newly appointed and extremely ambitious secretary of state and CIA director John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles.  Woodhouse most cleverly advocated the Dulles brothers’ desire to annihilate communism as a fuel to ignite the fire of mutual coalition in regard to the potential Iranian communist takeover.  Kinzer writes, “This appeal was calculated to stir the two brothers who would direct American foreign policy after Eisenhower’s inauguration.  John Foster Dulles, the incoming secretary of state, and Allen Dulles, the incoming CIA director, were among the fiercest of Cold Warriors.”[2]  Thus, with the Dulles brothers on board, Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was named as covert field agent and Operation AJAX commenced.

                Kinzer expresses that within the initial tactics of Operation Ajax, Roosevelt proved to be an extraordinarily and formidable coup instigator and improviser.  Initially, Roosevelt planned a shift in regime control.  Due to the steady infiltration of anti-Mossadegh propaganda, coordinated by mercenary-like Iranians including Shaban “The Brainless,” Jafari, British/Iranians spies, and the well informed and wealthy elite Rashidian brothers, as well as coordinated, fundamentalist, anti-Mossadegh religious sermons maintained by Ayatollah Kashani, this milieu of gradual dissonance created an ambivalent yearning for anti-Mossadegh protests.  Shah Muhammad Reza Shah, also orchestrated by Roosevelt, signed a firmans for the dismissal and arrest of Mossadegh and placement of General Zahedi as the new prime minister.  However, on the night of August 15^th, 1953, the coup failed by an internal plot leak; thus the Shah fled the country, Zahedi went into hiding, and all participants (who were found) of the coup were rounded up and arrested.  Fortunately for the United States and Britain, both Zahedi and Roosevelt avoided capture and plotted to strike again as soon as possible.

                As Kinzer articulates in his book, Roosevelt believed that the succession of the coup would “ultimately be decided on the streets” and in the masses.[3]  Thus, he continued to pay informants, hire mercenaries and fundamentalist mullahs to insight riots and extend the public element of rampaging masses.  At first Roosevelt choose to insight riots in favor of Mossadegh and opposing the monarchy, which made the public truly wonder if Mossadegh was just another tyrant.  The next day he instigated riots opposing Mossadegh, in which Mossadegh played into the Gambit and sent police to detain and suppress the Riots.  Since the image of Mossadegh was literally changing over night by the manipulations of Roosevelt, all Roosevelt needed to do now was to establish military support for the Zahedi take over.  Roosevelt then bribed military leaders by payoffs and the distribution of the signed firmans for Mossadegh’s removal.  With a somewhat controlled element within the masses, Roosevelt manipulated and channeled to next day’s riot to oppose Mossadegh, rally additional support for the Shah, exchange regimes, and proclaim Zahedi as the new prime minister.  After the initial failure, the resourceful improvised coup the following week on August 19^th, 1953, ran like clockwork.

                To Kinser, even though Roosevelt appears as either a hero or villain, the true hero of the story was none other than Mossadegh.  Kinser’s book illustrates Mossadegh as being a beacon of hope for the country of Iran, nationalism and democracy within the Middle East.  Kinser describes Mossadegh as an honest, benevolent person who truly desired and implored to ameliorate Iranian society and well-being through nationalism and democracy.  Kinser portrays Mossadegh’s fall from grace as martyrdom and a betrayal by the United States government and Iran itself.  Even though Kinser portrays the events of the Iranian coup of 1953 as objective whimsical attempt to once again legitimize British oil concessions in Iran under the guise of stopping the “domino effect or theory,” Kinzer expresses an unwritten sense of repugnance for ignorant British imperialists and the Dulles brothers’ hunger for power and lack of consideration for the future consequences of United States insurgencies or “black, covert ops.”[4]  For Kinser, this initial coup unleashed a realization for the CIA’s cheap ability to fix and manipulate world affairs.  Kinzer writes, “[Speaking of John Foster and Allen Dulles] their decisions to make Iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it.”[5]

                For Kinzer, Operation AJAX demonstrated decay in the foundation myth of the American nation; what originally hailed to being founded by God as a free nation that is honest, free, and provides liberty and justice for all, now instead insidiously topples governments, in a form of modern imperialism, for capitalism.   Kinzer attributes Operation AJAX as the deterrent for freedom and democracy within the Middle East, in which also created a mistrust for American involvement in world affairs.  Kinser notes,

Operation AJAX taught tyrants and aspiring tyrants there that the world’s most powerful governments were willing to tolerate limitless oppression as long as oppressive regimes were friendly to the West and to Western oil companies.  That helped tilt the political balance in a vast region away from freedom and towards dictatorship.     

               

For Kinser, Operation AJAX directly influenced in the vehement, intolerable relationship between the United States and Iran today.  Kinser expresses that after the coup in 1953 and the re-establishment of the Muhammad Reza Shah’s monarchy, Reza Shah became oppressive dictator by enslaving the Iranian people and threatening their security by means of torture and incarceration.  This resulted in the shattering explosion of Islamic fundamentalism,[6] which of course incited the hostage takeover of the American embassy in Tehran after the United States provided asylum and amnesty to the dictator that was meticulously placed in Operation AJAX.  This furthered the fission between the United States and Iran.  Kinser continues to state that because of the souring relations, the United States supported the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war with Iran which, of course, helped Hussein consolidate power within Iraq.  Finally, as the relationship between the United States and Iran manifested a complete schism in international relations, religious puritanical literalists such as Khomeini and Khamenei consolidated their power in Iran and initiated and anti-western campaign which included supporting so-called radical groups like Hamas and Hezbollah; these groups would inspire other radical groups such as the Taliban and Osama bin-Laden.  Thus, Kinser links Operation AJAX to modern terrorist acts.  Kinser states, “It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation AJAX through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.”[7]       

                Hence, even though Kinser’s book appears to be a surreal attempt for a Hollywood Espionage Thriller, his historical research and source material definitely warrants an extremely valid presentation of the Iranian coup of 1953.  Kinzer is very bold with his chain of influence regarding Operation AJAX as a direct link to the terrorist attacks of September 11^th, 2001.  But, Kinser definitely links Operation AJAX as a fallible catalyst that has influenced the soured relationship between the United States and Iran.  Kinzer’s book also merits a further investigation of the source material by the United States government, to not only make amends, but to also prevent future fallible attempts to manipulate world affairs.

 

                               

   

Bibliography

 

Kinzer, Stephen.  All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.  New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 20

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[1] Kinzer, 3.

[2] Kinzer, 4.

[3] Kinzer, 174.

[4] Kinzer, 208.

[5] Kinzer, 208.

[6] Kinzer, 202.

[7] Kinzer, 203-204.