Inferno, by Dan Brown (Book #3)

Inferno continues the saga of world renowned Harvard Symbologist, Robert Langdon.  I have read all of the books in this series, and although exciting, the evolution of the Robert Langdon character is now becoming somewhat trite.  For some reason, the flow of the book seemingly mimicked that of a Bourne novel by Robert Ludlum—including a major spell of amnesia.  

One of the most significant discrepancies involves Langdon’s eidetic memory.  At times, he is true to form, recalling every detail and description of any and all random things—Ken Jennings, look out!  Yet, there are a few times in the novel where this character paradigm is forgotten.  Perhaps, it provides Langdon some fallibility to make him more interesting and weak; but with similar paradigms in current movies and television (i.e. Sheldon Cooper, Big Bang Theory, or even Tony Stark, Avengers and Iron Man), Langdon’s obvious human fallibility comes across more as an aberration of the story rather than the character.

In addition, there are so many twists and turns, I feel it actually damages the plot, leaving it extremely implausible and, me, emotionally detached to the characters or story.  As soon as I started loving or hating a character, they switched sides—which was so exciting at first—but ultimately, left me dispassionate and apathetic as the flip-flopping continued.

All in all, though, the book is a quick and fun read.  Brown definitely played to his strengths, bringing the romantic details of historical architecture and traveling abroad to life.   In my opinion, the historicity of the story is another huge drawing point.  Brown masterfully weaves a medieval historical corollary with the futuristic, apocalyptic threats which accompany modernity.  For fun, culture, or a thrill—or if you are a fan of The Amazing Race—join Robert Langdon on another journey to save the world, the only way a Harvard Symbologist can…in a tweed jacket.

Heaven is for Real, by Todd Burpo (Book #2)

My initial inclination, as a graduate of academic religious studies, was to use my "highly critical methodologies" to analyze the veracity of the story and the storyteller.  Ultimately, though, I decided against it.  I wanted to appreciate the story as it was presented—as a spiritual and emotional testimony of faith.  Truly, this book resonated within my deeply.  Simply said, I was touched.  As a father, I was immediately connected to the boy and his father, and that connection never waned.  This book is a source of hope, faith, and purpose.  I highly recommend this book to those in need of a little spiritual enlightenment—or those who just enjoy reading about supernatural phenomena that doesn’t involve fanged supermodels. 

 

The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, by Peter T. Leeson (Book #1)

***Spoiler Alert***

Who would have thought that a “pirate code” actually existed?  No, I am not necessarily speaking of the “parley” between the Captains, Jack Sparrow and Barbosa, in Disney’s, Pirates of the Caribbean.  In the Invisible Hook, Leeson weighs the risks of piracy versus the reward of booty in the early eighteenth century, and found there were a myriad of reasons to become a pirate.  Monetarily speaking, you could make 33 to 121 times more as a pirate than a legitimate military sailor or merchant.  Over a career, that’s mucho dinero.  Is it possible to connect with a pirate employer on LinkedIn?

The risk, though…you’re hanged if you’re caught—which is seemingly somewhat debilitating.  However, Leeson calculates the risk as minimal—since we are talking about vast bodies of water and an approximate average military count of 13,000 military representatives each year during the first two decades of the eighteenth century.  Additionally, pirates usually traveled with at least 80 men in a crew, and sometimes in fleets, which reached up to 2,000 pirates (as did Captain Morgan’s).  So unless they were considerably out-numbered, they stood a great chance of winning a skirmish.  I wonder if they would cover the moving costs in regards to time travel?

The most surprising fact: the pirate code was actually a democracy based, free market system juxtaposed with an autocratic based, planned economy proffered by the private mercantile and military industries.  Pirates enjoyed the ability to elect their leaders—or instigate mutinies—as well as maintained incentive structures such as profit sharing and bonuses.  What’s more, Leeson articulates another historical paradigm of a successful democracy based system long before the American Revolution, and the worldwide phenomenon of Nationalism.   I think I wanna be a bloody pirate…This book is a very interesting read for all historians and economists…or just pirate enthusiasts and/or live action role players.

A New Challenge...An Online Book Club!

Ever since I was a little boy, I have loved to read.  It doesn’t necessarily matter the subject, I just enjoy the opportunity to open up my mind and absorb knowledge, stories, and culture.  Additionally, I have always wanted to join a book club—albeit, sometimes it is so hard to find the time, or the company, to venture with me on this journey.  Nonetheless, as a challenge to myself, I decided to make a list of 100 books that I would like to read before I turn forty.  Currently, I am thirty-four, so I have some time; and I decided to blog about my experiences with the books—like a review—to help others in their decision to read along with me…hence the group thing.  The books I’ve selected delve into all genres of fiction and non-fiction (for my fellow nerds…).  I hope you enjoy!

The Domestic Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II: Ottoman Ambitions to Ascendancy

 

During the nascent years of sovereignty, the Ottoman state ascended to greatness on wings of merit established by the charismatic leadership of a dynastic sultanate, as well as the gazi attitude of holy warriors defending the faith and establishing a noble Muslim state.  Albeit, after the rule of Suleyman the Magnificent, the Ottoman zenith diminished into a gradual decline in authoritative control due to the errant lack of charismatic leadership of the sultanate regarding their training, lack of fratricide, and primogeniture ascendancy, as well as the inherent stagnation and  evanescent discipline that once  defined the military might of the janissary corps.[1]  Thus, the prestige of the Ottoman state slowly evaporated in an evanescent cloud of corruption, inefficiency, and undisciplined institutional weakness making the Ottoman state the “sick man of Europe.” 

However in the nineteenth century CE,  Mahmud II attempted to not only reaffirm the necessity for the modernization of the Ottoman state by reforms to articulate the rebirth of Ottoman formidability, but also to reestablish the arbitrary authority of the central government and role of the sultan as a  charismatic and autocratic leader.  In his attempt to reform and solidify an Ottoman reemergence within the sphere of European power, Mahmud’s reforms never equated immediate success; notwithstanding, the reforms of Mahmud not only changed the institutional structure within the military, society, and bureaucracy which strengthened the central government, state military force, and role of the sultan, but Mahmud’s reforms also initiated the process of modernization which ultimately would lead to the further reformation of the Ottoman state and warrant patriotism within the Ottoman Community.      .

            After Selim III failed in his attempts to reform the Ottoman state and was placed in the kafes, Mahmud realized the authority of the central government, especially regarding the mantle of the sultanate, manifested a deficiency in autocratic arbitration.[2]  The forces of opposition including the institutions of the ulema, ayans, and the janissary corps maintained an unwritten alliance against reforming and modernizing the state.  For the ulema, the preservation of Islamic ideals and tradition preceded any type of innovation or secular modernization.[3]  The ayans desired to maintain their legacy as provincial leaders or aristocracy which required an unreformed, weak central government and its dependency on the ayans for military support during times of war.[4]  As for the janissary corps, reforms regarding the modernization of the military and creation of entirely new military units and institutions, such as Selim’s Nizam-i Cedid, only threatened janissary existence; thus, in the preservation of their professions and traditions, the janissaries refused any type of military reforms and modernizations with ire.[5]  Therefore, for Mahmud to succeed with his reforms, he needed to establish a common bond of allegiance with the ulema and undermine the institutions of the ayans and janissary corps.

            During his training in the kafes and time spent under the influence of Selim, Mahmud developed elements of altruistic reforms to recuperate and modernize the Ottoman state as well as reaffirm the arbitration of the sultan and centralized government.  The time spent with Selim in the kafes proliferated ideas of reforms along with a calculated patience with plans to accomplish these desired reforms in addition to undermine and abolish the institutions of the ayans and janissaries.[6] 

As sultan, Mahmud’s first ploy was to obtain support from the ulema, both in the upper and lower factions, so Mahmud would be able to gain a popular momentum amongst the reaya.  Gaining the ulema’s support, especially in regards to the lower ulema, was essential for his reforms to succeed.  First, Mahmud strengthened his support within the upper ulema by coercion and enticement as well as by appointing his greatest supporters as Seyhulislam in addition to other key positions within the bureaucracy.[7]  All contrary to his ideals were thus discharged.  Also, to gain support from the lower ulema, Mahmud manifested religious, proprietary behavior by becoming visually apparent within public religious society.  Furthermore, Mahmud provided the lower ulema with additional opportunities for employment by building mosques, establishing religious vakifs, and issuing decrees to stabilize religious education within the reaya.[8]  By these actions, Mahmud received the support of both factions of the ulema. 

With the support of the upper and lower ulema, Mahmud furthered their involvement within his policies by establishing a direct attachment between the ulema and his reforms.  Mahmud packaged his reforms as an opportunity to ameliorate the Ottoman state after the ultimate Muslim paradigm of contemporary success, Muhammad Ali of Egypt.[9]  Since the reforms, rhetorically, were patterned after a Muslim paradigm of religion and tradition and not a secular European model, the ulema actively participated in the reforms and assisted also in gaining the support of the populace.  Thus, with the religious element of the ulema and public status-quo all backing the adoption of the “modern Islamic method” of reforms, Mahmud initiated his most prominent reforms which directly involved the modernization of the military.[10]

            Initially, Mahmud reformed the janissary corps not by creating an entirely new army, but by gaining support of many of the elite janissary leaders and evoking the eskenci reforms which created an active military force within the janissary corps.[11]  Mahmud withdrew circa eight thousand janissaries to fill the ranks of the nascent eskenci force.  The eskenci reforms enabled the military to reaffirm discipline and formidability without breaking the previously signed Sened-i Itta’at agreement.[12]  However, the soup cauldrons were overturned and the janissaries revolted immediately after the eskenci reforms in the early morning of June 15, 1826.  With the support of the faithful within the populace as well as the already somewhat modernized Artillery corps, Mahmud quickly routed the janissary revolts and abolished the entire corps, including the new eskenci force, on June 17, 1826.[13] 

With the janissary corps abolished, Mahmud was free to initiate a new modernized military.  The creation of a new army was extremely vital for the Ottoman state because of the precarious environment of the time and lack of military defense and internal policing.  Therefore Mahmud instigated the Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muuhammadiye, or Mansure army, on the very same day as the janissaries were abolished. The regulation of the Mansure army significantly mirrored Selim’s Nizam-i Cedid in most aspects; also the inclusion of an imam or religious patron to every one hundred infantry men further invested ulema support to Mahmud’s new reforms and the Mansure army.[14] 

Mahmud established further military reforms by initiating additional programs vis-à-vis military education that further developed military training, tactics, and discipline, most importantly, pertaining to the military officer corps and their modern officer’s school.[15]  Mahmud not only established new military training schools such as the Mehteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye or School for Military Science, but refurbished existing military training schools such as the engineering schools as well as the palace school within Topkapi palace that trained an elite imperial guard known as the “Trained Imperial Gardeners.”[16]  Mahmud formulated and modernized new military units with a hierarchy of military leadership and organization in addition to the incorporation and reorganization of new and reformed naval, cavalry, infantry, and artillery or topcular units. 

Yet the only merit in which resulted from these reforms was the strengthening of the centralized government including the autocratic position of sultan; for the first test of the Mansure army resulted in an utter defeat to a still superior Russian army.  However, due to the strengthened centralized government, the ayans relinquished great autonomy.[17]  For the ayans innately benefited from a weak centralized government and also a weak central military.  As the centralized government gradually became stronger during the reign of Mahmud as well as the burgeoning Mansure army, the ayans gradually were displaced or defeated with the exception of Muhammad Ali in Egypt.[18]

The Mansure army differed greatly in might and organization from the paradigm of Muhammad Ali’s modern army, due to the short time span in which Mahmud had to commence reforms, train new qualified officers, and amass redoubtable military alumni before he again had to divert his full attention to pressing internal and external threats on multiple Ottoman fronts.  Nevertheless from defeat, Mahmud realized that not only must he reform the military, but it was also necessary to reform all aspects of Ottoman life.[19]

            Mahmud commenced a program of reforms that involved informing and enlightening the Ottoman populace which proved to become the “backbone and model for the Tanzimat reforms.”[20]  Mahmud manifested affluence in publishing books and newspapers in Turkish, as well as other western adaptations to educate and in a sense activate patriotism or social activism concerning the creation of unity within the Ottoman diversity.[21]  Also, Mahmud further westernized the bureaucracy by instituting new modern government positions and introducing three branches within government administration, namely the kalemiye or administration, ilmiye or judicial-religious branch, and most importantly the seyfiye or military branch which further cemented central authority and military significance.[22]

 Adversely, the ulema now found themselves as accessories to not only modernization, but to secular elements of westernization within the Ottoman state; nevertheless, the ulema were bound to agree with the centralized government, especially Mahmud, because they had already prescribed support and deemed Mahmud’s modernization as scrupulous and appropriate religion.  Mahmud further esteemed the sultanate by diminishing the Grand Vizier to a less significant lieutenant-like role as bas vekil or prime minister. Thus without the adversity of the ulema, ayans, and janissaries, Mahmud solidified the authority of the central government and the role of the sultan as the heart of the central government.

            Even though the majority of Mahmud’s reforms proved unsuccessful mainly because of the lack of military leadership and the inability to train efficient military units with alacrity, he initiated the process and idea that the Ottoman state needed to be reformed in order to ameliorate its position within the world society.[23]  Moreover, Mahmud annihilated or nullified all institutions that stood against modernization and westernization.  Consequently, Mahmud was able to once again strengthen the centralized government and, more importantly, the mantle of the Sultan.  In most cases, for reforms to warrant success, it is obligatory to either force reforms by domination or allow time for acceptance to be homogeneous.  In Mahmud’s scenario, time would warrant a sense of success regarding the modernization and westernization of the Ottoman state.

Bibliography

 

Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “Ottoman Attitudes to the Rise of Balkan Nationalism.”  War and Society in East Central Europe.  NEJS 188b assigned reading.  Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839. NEJS 188b assigned reading. Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Levy, Avigdor.  “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II.”  NEJS 188b assigned reading.  Brandeis University, Waltham, MA.

 

Lewis, Bernard.  The Emergence of Modern Turkey.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

 

Sadat, Deena R. “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century.” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44 No. 3 (September 1972).

 

Shaw, Stanford J.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

 

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw.  History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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[1] Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 110-111.

[2] Avigdor Levy, “Ottoman Attitudes to the Rise of Balkan Nationalism,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 325.

[3] Avigdor Levy, “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 13.

[4] Deena R. Sadat, “Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44 No. 3 (September 1972), 346-347.

[5] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 70-71.

[6] Ibid., 77.

[7] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 15.

[8] Ibid., 15.

[9] Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 28-29.

[10] Ibid., 16-17.

[11] Stanford J Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 19.

[12] Shaw, 5.

[13] Ibid., 22.

[14] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 23.

[15] Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839,” (NEJS 188b assigned reading, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA), 32 and 39.

[16] Shaw, 24.

[17] Karsh, 32.

[18] Sadat, 362-363.

[19] Shaw, 35.

[20] Ibid., 35.

[21] Ibid., 35.

[22] “The Ottoman Ulema,” 31.

[23] “The Officer Corps,” 38-39.