Thursday, August 29, 2013

The Mihna: Ma’mun’s Inquisition for Supremacy (Middle Eastern History, Medieval)


Abstract

 

There is still a great deal of uncertainty why in fact Ma’mun implemented an inquisition (mihna), from 833 to 845 CE, amongst the very Islamic community (umma) he was leading.  Many historians have argued that the mihna was actually instigated to recentralize the political authority of the caliphate to counteract a burgeoning movement of religious leadership within the umma; others have disputed that the mihna was enacted to discourage religious interpretation on a local, unofficial level by those same leaders.  These two hypotheses have both dominated mihna research throughout modern scholarship, yet they have both been isolated as separate reasons for the implementation of the mihna.  However, Ma’mun strategically initiated the mihna as a means to ascertain central leadership as well as nullify any outside claims to authority in both political and religious spheres.  Consequently by design, the umma would strictly depend on Ma’mun’s absolute authority like the prophet, Muhammad. 

Keywords:  The Mihna, Ma’mun, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ulama, Islamic Law, Islamic Theology.


 

 
Introduction: Polemics in Succession and Theology

 

During the ‘Abbasid dynastic rule over the umma or Islamic religious community, during the eighth and ninth centuries CE, an inquisition known as the mihna solidified dissent between the local and central authorities.  The mihna attempted to initiate a reconciliation and centralization of religious authority within the caliphate concerning their religious and legal authority over the umma.  This inquisition or mihna, in actuality, further dichotomized the rift between the caliph and the ulama.  The outcome greatly favored the authority of the local ulama in regards to the interpretation of Islamic law (Shari’a) and religious doctrine, in addition to how these interpretations applied to the umma. 

Today, the study of the mihna warrants a vast proposed attempt to understand the fundamental purposes of why it was initiated.   However, a common historical conclusion seems rather elusive as well as inconclusive in regards to historians’ viewpoints concerning the influencing factors and reasons behind the validation of the mihna by Ma’mun, the ‘Abbasid caliph, within the first few scores of the ninth century.  Thus it is essential to look rationally from the perspective of Ma’mun to determine the particular reasoning for the inquisition.  The two main conclusive hypotheses relating to the commencement of the mihna agree that either, the mihna was to once again centralize religious arbitration within the caliphate while legitimizing Ma’mun’s rule as caliph; or it was to oppose the local distilling effort of the traditional ulama vis-à-vis their developments in their religious interpretations of the hadith and establishment of the external schools of theology [kalam] and law [fiqh] (Zaman, 1997, p. 2).  Yet, perhaps both hypotheses congruently support each other.  For the initiation of the mihna in the perspective of the caliph Ma’mun endowed the potential ability to oppose the authority of the ulama that did not support his doctrine and leadership by nullifying any legitimacy in their leadership roles within their schools of kalam.  It also negated the ulama’s opportunity to interpret and decree on religious law or fiqh, which would indeed once again strengthen the centralized authority of the institution of the caliphate and legitimize Ma’mun’s rule as both the religious and political leader, like unto Muhammad.

After the death of the Prophet, not only did the question of succession create a slight separation and dissension within the community, another significant question arose within the nascent religion.  Who are the true believers and members of the umma? This question was a natural communalistic way of thinking for Arabs (Watt, 1985, p. 11).  Thus, this particular question encouraged interpretation and the implementation of ‘aqidahs which led to the creation and separation of theological schools of kalam and its theologians or mutakallimun.  Not only did these schools of kalam implement interpretations of Shari’a, the Qur’an, and hadith as well as the importance and relevance of each, they also cemented differentiations regarding theological dogma within the umma.  Even though the Qur’an and the hadith manifested the fundamental structure of both religious beliefs and law, the different schools of kalam demonstrated variations in both religious opinion and interpretations in each particular school.  The first two groups that established a juxtaposed spectrum of religious doctrine were the Kharijites and the Murjites (Waines, 1995, p. 104-106).

 
Kharijites and Murjites

 

The Kharijites decided initially to depose ‘Ali and the Umayyad dynasty (661-750), due to the Kharijite belief that ‘Ali and the Umayyad dynasty controlled no particular right to lead due to their veering practices and corruption (Nagel, 2000, p. 41-48).  The Kharijites principled themselves on the redeeming quality of righteousness based directly upon fundamental doctrines instituted by the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an, those which they believed the Umayyad dynasty did not prescribe to (Watt, 1985, p. 11).  Thus for the Kharijites, the authority to choose the caliph pertained directly to the true believers or those free from sin (Lapidus, 1975, p. 366).  Also, since the Kharijites believed that all sinners inherently were unbelievers, the Kharijites preserved the right to purify the nonbelievers from the flock and purge it of sin (Watt, 1985, p. 8).  Their slogan was “No obedience to the creature in disobedience of the Creator” (Nagel, 2000, p. 42).  This not only conceded a new dreadful element of moral obligation with the consequence of death attached to agency, but the Kharijites initiated the ability to schism and form a difference of opinion relating to Islamic dogma (Lapidus, 1975, p. 376).

On the other end of the spectrum, the Murjites established a different suggestion pertaining to the envelopment of sin in regards to who were actual believers (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  The Murjites ascertained the simple fact that mankind will sin because mankind is not perfect, thus the irja or postponement (suspension) of judgment will be left for God alone (Watt, 1985, p. 12).  Accordingly, a believer was one who had secured iman (belief or faith) through their knowledge of God in their mind and then essentially merited from confirmations and confessions of the heart and of the tongue (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  Ultimately, for the Murjites, God judged the true intentions of the hearts of men.  However, the problematic element within Murjite belief pertained directly to the status of works.  Murjites maintained that faith was only determined according to belief and not the acts of one’s hands (Waines, 1995, p. 106).  Therefore, if mankind testified with their tongues and hearts without manifesting assiduous works that corroborated mankind’s belief, for the Murjites, this was sufficient enough to be classified as a believer.  Consequently, a Murjite believer’s faith could potentially be as or succeed that of the Prophet as well as the righteous caliphs (Patton, 1897, p. 39).  Murjite ideals resonated deeply within Ma’mun’s concept of leadership; and perhaps, these ideals could possibly stand as a sign of legitimacy for Ma’mun’s succession if he could garner control of both religious and political spheres (Ibn Tayfur, 1987, p. 82-86).

 
The Emergence of Theological Schools and Leaders

 

As the pervasive propagation of the religious schools of kalam manifested a more prevalent and ubiquitous nature, the phenomena endorsed an affinity of depending on these schools of kalam more substantially than the caliphate; the result being an affluence of several different schools of kalam, along with several differentiations in religious dogma.  These fundamental differentiations in religious dogma, which derived from the same sources, introduced many different interpretations for the umma to follow, thus each individual within the umma chose to prescribe to a particular or specific group of Islamic kalam and fiqh.  Hence with the establishment of different schools of kalam, kalam introduced the novel institution of ulama or local religious leaders, which were able to create and gain a sense of local autonomy regarding religious interpretation.  Islamic historian Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1997) has written concerning the ulama:

 

The early ‘Abbasid period saw the emergence of the religious scholars, the ulama, as a visible and increasingly influential religious elite, the beginnings of schools of law, major developments in the study of hadith and towards the formalization of the concept of the Prophet’s sunna, and other developments which eventually led to the crystallization of Sunni and Shiite Islam. (p. 1-2)   

 

Therefore, the religious implications established regarding the nascent institution of the ulama and the establishment of schools of kalam and fiqh, which were able to interpret dogma on the local level, relinquished the centralized power and authority of the caliphate to maintain religious authority over the umma.  This separation warranted a fundamental fissure between the ideal of unity between religion and state.  Again Zaman (1997) stated:

           

This model, which postulates a comprehensive separation between religion and the state, may be paraphrased thus: the caliphs and the ulama were in sharp conflict over matters of religious authority; the caliphs lost the contest and came effectively to be excluded from all say in matters of the law and in whatever else the ulama defined as their exclusive preserve; and, once in place, this model of separation essentially persisted for much of the medieval Islamic history. (p. 2)

 

Initially the prophet Muhammad, as well as the four righteous caliphs, commenced the idea of one centralized leader manifesting both political and religious arbitration over the umma.  This idea of a philosopher or prophet king distinguished the paradigm of a noble revelatory leader with whom the religious community could rely and manifest both their religious and political confidence (Lapidus, 1975, p. 364).  This unity demonstrated sagacity as long as the leader of the umma exhibited admirable attributes behind which the community could rally.  Notwithstanding, if the leader did not manifest a sense of righteousness and charismatic prudence, a reaction of dissonance was inevitable.  This was exactly what happened within the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid dynasties (Lapidus, 1975, p. 369).  Thus in order to legitimize his rule, redefine the role of the caliph, and reestablish the authority and power within the centralized leadership, Ma’mun used the incumbent attraction of theology for political advantages and initiated the mihna to discredit the ulama, especially within the traditional schools of kalam and fiqh, those who discriminated against his logic and idea of doctrine inherent to the rationalization of the creation of the Qur’an.

First, Ma’mun desperately needed to legitimize his rule within the umma as caliph in being both lawful and as the will of God (Tabari, 1996, p. 5755).  The proceeding caliph and father of Ma’mun, Harun Rashid, bestowed the mantle of the caliphate upon his younger son, Ma’mun’s younger brother, al-Amin (Glasse, 2002, p. 284).  Hence, in order to retain the mantle of the caliphate for himself after the death of Harun Rashid, Ma’mun instigated a militant power struggle against al-Amin, which eventually enabled Ma’mun to succeed in taking the throne as caliph (Figueroa, 2007, p. 648).  Notwithstanding, since al-Amin originally received the right to rule as caliph, many traditionalists opposed the rule of Ma’mun (Glasse, 2002, p. 284).  Consequently, it became essential for Ma’mun to legitimize his rule as caliph and undermine the influence of the traditionalist in regards to the umma; so with the implementation of the mihna, which highlighted a more rationalist perspective of theological doctrine, Ma’mun outweighed traditionalist dissonance with rationalist support to manipulate the consensus and legitimize his rule as caliph over the umma.

 
Ma’mun and Ideologies

 

The persecution that was the mihna, inaugurated by al-Ma’mun on 27 January in 833, originally manifested strict disdain for schools of kalam who supported traditional orthodoxy in favor of the school within whom condoned a more rational element (Nagel, 2000, p. 109).  Ira Lapidus (1975), an expert on the mihna, has established, “In 833 al-Ma’mun inaugurated a mihna or inquisition to force government officials and religious leaders to accept his religious views and his authority in matters of religious ritual and doctrine” (p. 379).  Now instead of the polar opposition similar to that of the Kharijites and Murjites of the ninth century, Ma’mun rallied behind a more rational interpretation regarding the perspective in which the Qur’an is a temporal, created thing in contrast to the traditionalist doctrine of an uncreated, eternal Qur’an.  This belief played the most essential role within the mihna, for it was the fundamental question during the inquisition.  

Originally, historiographers exonerated this rational element of dogma by linking this belief directly to the idea that Ma’mun, to centralize his religious authority, needed to establish and solidify a set standard for religious doctrine and discredit all opposition, which of course, was traditional orthodoxy.  Furthermore, Ma’mun chose to support rational groups that collaborated with the idea of the created Qur’an.  However, historians failed to agree on which rational group truly influenced the incorporation of the created Qur’an.

Mu’tazilite Ideologies

 

After looking at the historiography relevant to the mihna, historian Walter M. Patton initially became the expert within the field with his dissertation piece in 1897 on Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and the mihna.  Patton (1897) ascribed the fundamental idea of the created Qur’an to the Mu’tazilite influence on Ma’mun (p. 47).  The Mu’tazilite school definitely fit the parameters of rationalists believing in the created Qur’an, as well as opposing traditionalists (Nagel, 2000, p. 102 and 109).  Moreover, Ma’mun could also be directly linked to the Mu’tazilite influence, since they found favor in the ‘Abbasid court and legitimized their interpretation of the Qur’an as being created in 827.

Since Patton was one of the first major scholars on the mihna and believed that Mu’tazilites deeply influenced Ma’mun’s credence for the incorporation of the created Qur’an, many historians since have agreed with this analysis.  Islamists like Amin, Hitti, Kennedy, and Watt also agreed with the analysis of Patton as well as the idea for the attempt at discrediting the opposition (Nawas, 1994, p. 616)  The direct link from Ma’mun’s mihna to the Mu’tazilites, for these historians, highlighted a direct causation for the inquisition; for the influence manifested a lucid link. 

Primarily, the theological link of the created Qur’an pertained directly to school of Mu’tazilites due to the fact that it was one of the most central themes of Mu’tazilite doctrine (Patton, 1897, p. 47).  The establishment of the created Qur’an doctrine developed directly from the Mu’tazilite definition of the fundamental and most crucial principle of tawhid which is absolutely inherent within their “five principles or fundamentals” (al-Jabbar, 1997, p. 91 and 96).  The Mu’tazilites developed these principles by the implementation of their “rational” kalam, based on the dialectic process or science, which anchored arguments on demonstrative proofs and rendered their so-called axiomatic syllogisms sound and beyond dispute since the proofs were based upon reason and the senses.  Basically, for the Mu’tazilites, it is essential to understand that God is the only existent that exists, as a necessary being, eternally within His absolute oneness.  Nothing can exist eternally outside of God and His unique essence; thus if the Qur’an was uncreated and eternal it would exist outside of God’s oneness, eternality, uniqueness, and omnipotence (Nasution, 1997, p. 190).   Therefore it is impossible for anything, including the Qur’an, to exist eternally outside of God, so the Qur’an must be created and contingent on God’s existence (al-Jabbar, 1997, p. 96-97).

In addition to a theological link, Ma’mun could have also benefited from Mu’tazilite dogma regarding the speech of God as a political tool.  According to the Mu’tazilites, God does not speak nor will He ever (Madelung, 1985, p. 506).  God is completely transcendent and does not maintain any anthropomorphic characteristics (Nasution, 1997, p. 190).  That is to say that He is a necessary existence, independent and beyond human comprehension or quality.  Thus, because of His transcendence and man’s ultimate submission to Him, there will be no likeness between the creator and the created.  In other words, for the Mu’tazilites, man and the absolute Real, in their juxtaposition, cannot maintain a similitude of qualities or attributes.  Through ta’wil or interpretation, based on reason and philology, the Mu’tazilites believed what mankind figuratively called speech was actually a particular sound created and made heard by God, so that mankind may hear and transmit that which God desired for them to hear.  Yet, since it was created by God and not the actual speech of God, the Qur’an again sustained characteristics of being created and temporal (Madelung, 1985, p. 506).  Furthermore, the words or speech of God was not immutable, thus Ma’mun could manipulate or interpret religious rulings to placate and support any law or doctrine he created.

Finally, Ma’mun maintained particularly close ties with Mu’tazilites, for even his most prominent teachers, Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf, Nazzam, Futti, Samama ibn Ashras, were Mu’tazilites (Nawas, 1994, p. 616; Ibn al-Morteza, 1988, p. 49; Mas’udi, 1970, p. 227; Ibn Khalakan, p. 177; Shahrestani, 1979, p. 71).  Moreover, the Mu’tazilites benefited from the favor of the regime within the ‘Abbasid court as the legitimate school of kalam.  Thus, it seemed that the Mu’tazilite school of kalam had solidified an essential role within the incorporation of the mihna.

However, many historians concluded that even though the Mu’tazilites might have had some influential aspects regarding Ma’mun and the incorporation of the created Qur’an during the mihna, in all honesty, it was more of a coincidence rather than a conclusive determination.  In fact, Ma’mun appeared to be supporting multifarious sources of inspiration in regards to his personal theological creeds.  For instance, it is true that Ma’mun was in contact with many Mu’tazilites, but he was also influenced by many non-Mu’tazilites.  John Nawas (1994), in his article “A Reexamination of Three Current Explanations for al-Mamun’s Introduction of the Mihna,”   proposed that, “The sources also tell us that al-Ma’mun had equally strong and intimate bonds with others outside Mu’tazilite circles, however, of whom some were in fact anti-Mu’tazilites” (p. 616). Thus, Ma’mun maintained the company of anti-Mu’tazilites such as Bishr al-Marisi, Dirar Ibn ‘Amr, and Yahya Ibn Aktham, who were open foes of the Mu’tazilites, rationalism, and even the science of kalam.

In addition, by examining the attention given to the Mu’tazilites by traditional orthodox groups to the like of Ibn Hanbal, some historians again concluded that the Mu’tazilites did not play a significant role of involvement with Ma’mun’s mihna due to the lack of attention written in traditionalists’ sources (Peters, 1976, p. 11).  Historian Christopher Melchert (1997) precluded Mu’tazilite involvement when he wrote in his article “The Adversaries of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal:” 

 

First the traditionalists’ main struggle was not against the Mu’tazila.  Had they been the main adversaries, we should have many more statements against them from Ahmad, his contemporaries and his followers.  Doubtless Ahmad and other traditionalists disagreed with the Mu’tazila and would use strong language about them; however, they saw their main adversaries elsewhere. (p. 252)

 

So for Melchert (1997), not only did the Mu’tazilites not contribute a significant influence to Ma’mun, but the Mu’tazilites only emerged as a dominant group among rationalists at the end of the ninth century (p. 252). 

This conflicting evidence certainly needs to be taken into account, for Melchert and Nawas are very bold in denying the avid Mu’tazilite role within the mihna, since, as previously mentioned, Mu’tazilite scholars mentored Ma’mun in theological studies and Ma’mun elected a central theme within Mu’tazilite doctrine.  It is safe to say that, even though the Mu’tazilites might not have directly facilitated the installation of the mihna within the ninth century, they were at the very least an indirect influence on Ma’mun and his creeds as a foundation for opposing the traditional element within the mihna.

Both Nawas (1994) and Melchert (1997) disagreed with to the idea of direct Mu’tazilite involvement.  Instead, both historians mentioned the Hanafi school as a conspiratorial participant within the mihna.  Both historians added, since the Hanifis also believed in the created Qur’an, the probability of their role within the mihna is high (Nawas, 1994, p. 617).  Albeit within the Fiqh al-Akbar of Imam al-A’zam Abu Hanifah, he wrote the contrary:

 

The Qur’an is the Word of God Almighty, written on collections of leaves (masahif), preserved in men’s hearts, recited on men’s tongues, and sent down to the Prophet, upon whom be God’s peace and blessing.  Our uttering of the Qur’an is created, and our recitation of the Qur’an is created, but the Qur’an itself is uncreated. (Lumbard, personal communication, Fall, 2007)

 

Thus, Nawas and Melchert may have misinterpreted both the involvement of the Hanafi school within the mihna as well as their fiqh regarding the Qur’an.  For in the Hanafi school of fiqh the Qur’an is uncreated, or is it?  Even though Hanifah wrote that the Qur’an is uncreated, historians have disputed the actual doctrines of the Hanafi school during the time of the mihna.  Melchert (1997) mentioned this idea in his article when he stated, “The situation was complicated by their having developed a more traditionalist party among the Hanafiya, who did not, for example, affirm a create[d] Qur’an.  Until late in the ninth century, however, the Hanafiya are mainly to be placed on the rationalist side of the great struggle” (p. 252).   Accordingly, for Melchert, the Hanafi School rebutted their own doctrine within themselves and established a complete metamorphosis of thought by adopting contrary ideas and changing from a completely disputed and rational based theology to a more traditional stance within less than a century.  To say the least, it is self-evident that the Hanafi school was becoming more dissonant within their own theology during the ninth century.  Therefore, their school of kalam could not have been a direct catalyst for the mihna because of their own inner struggle and metamorphosis that emerged during that same time period.

Shiite Ideologies

 

Another group said to influence Ma’mun concerning the mihna was the Shiite element.  Historians like Sourdel, Watt, and Nagel believed the intrinsic value of Shiite doctrine was appreciated by Ma’mun pertaining directly to the institution of the imam (Nawas, 1994, p, 619; Sourdel, 1962).  Ma’mun specifically integrated the idea of imam directly into his role as caliph (Safva, 1937, p. 377).  The role of imam greatly influenced Ma’mun for it was the exact status of Ma’mun’s ambitions (Nagel, 2000, p. 100).  In Shi’ism, the imam portrayed an essential role of veneration as both the political and religious leader of Shiites.  Also, the imam descended first from ‘Ali and then the Prophet Muhammad himself.  This amalgamation of imam and caliph, as Ma’mun believed, essentially gave him supreme autonomy over the umma as well as blood ties to ‘Ali and Muhammad.  Even though Shiites believe the Qur’an to be uncreated, the idea of the imam significantly influenced Ma’mun with regards to the potential control the mihna could provide (ibn Babevayh, p. 226-227).

            Yet even though the importance of these historical investigations helped illuminate certain aspects of the mihna, a determination could not be made regarding which rational element directly influenced Ma’mun in regards to the adaptation of the dogma in reference to the created Qur’an.  In fact, Ma’mun actually manifested an eclectic idea by incorporating different elements of rational kalam and integrating them to create a galvanized, hybrid theology which would directly cause controversy within the opposing traditional element, thus giving Ma’mun an instrument to discredit the traditional creeds (Nawas, 1994, p. 619).  Since Ma’mun demonstrated an eclectic idea of incorporating a mixture of rational and Shiite creeds to create his own proposed doctrine, modern historians realized that Patton’s original thesis regarding strictly Mu’tazilite involvement and influence in the creation of the inquisition and directly influencing Ma’mun’s created Qur’an theology was rendered insubstantial.  Therefore in retrospect of Patton’s thesis, the collaboration of the two hypotheses created a more efficient explanation for the commencement of the mihna.

            Therefore, why did Ma’mun adopt the idea of the created Qur’an?  The exact specific reason for the created Qur’an doctrine, the adopted credo, escaped explicit explanation within primary sources contemporary to the mihna.  However, by supporting one particular vantage point as well as drawing the support of that particular vantage point, Ma’mun consolidated his authority established a commonality within the status quo in regards to his definition of the ijma or consensus and by deposing and discrediting the adversity.  Ma’mun displayed a great formidability as ruler and was seriously determined to preserve the importance of the caliphate and reconfirm its absolute mantle of authority.   John Nawas (1996) explained in his subsequent article, “The Mihna of 218 A.H. /833 A.D. Revisited: An Empirical Study,” “Ma’mun was basically setting his sights on the future, aiming to secure for the caliphal institution a universal and unquestioned authority on all matters, secure and sacred, a status that was in force during the Umayyad period and was especially characteristic of the founders of Islam but had since vanished” (p. 699).  Therefore the mihna manifested the perfect opportunity for Ma’mun to consolidate his power by discrediting the local traditional ulama, so the umma would again look to a centralized figure to not only lead, but interpret the Qur’an and hadith as well.

Ideologies of the Mihna

 

With the establishment of the mihna, four months before the death of Ma’mun, he instituted an inquisition in which they questioned many ulama to determine their theological understanding and discredit any altercations.  This phenomenon provided Ira Lapidus and Wilfred Madelung the support for their thesis that the institution of the mihna combated the “festering resentments” for the opposing traditional ulama including those who maintained a Khurasanian background (Nawas, 1996, p. 699).  Thus within the initial mihna letter to governor Ishaq b. Ibrahim of Baghdad, Ma’mun first solicited the apprehension of the high officials of Baghdad, and then in later letters surmised the interrogation of the lower hierarchies of ulama.  Ma’mun specified the groups of ulama to be questioned including the “qudat (plural of qadi) and shuhud (court officials), witnesses, muhaddithun including the forty-four traditional ulama, and the fuqaha (plural of faqih) who were experts in law and theology” (Nawas, 1996, p. 707-708).   Ma’mun targeted these intellectual elite because of their exceptional character and abilities.  For these men participated within the umma as the most influencing and intellectually qualified proponents of society; therefore these men caused the diluting of the caliphate authority in relation to the interpretation of theology and law.  The most famous interrogates were those of the Shafi’i school of law in addition to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.

            During the interrogation sessions of the mihna, the persecuted were given one simple question concerning the doctrine of the creation of the Qur’an.   Is the Qur’an created?  This question provided an advantage to the persecutors since it nullified all equivocation or ambivalent dialectic debate in syllogistic form.  Either the accused agreed or disagreed (Nawas, 1994, p. 623). 

Another great advantage of this interrogation method and especially the specific question relating to the creation of the Qur’an existed within the Qur’an itself.  Consequently within the Qur’an itself, no logical or authoritative passage specifically disputes either opinion regarding the creation of the Qur’an, thus the reigning doctrine based its authenticity intrinsically upon the established structure imposed (Nawas, 1994, p. 623).  The verse in question uses the Arabic verb, Ja’ala, which has been translated as, made.  Al-Qur’an (2006) states, “We have made it an Arabic Qur’an so that you may apply reason” (43:3).

Within the examination of the mihna and the opinion of the created Qur’an, Ma’mun divulged a common understanding regarding Qur’anic interpretation that created a sense of debate within the umma.  This opinion was not unique for Ma’mun, the Mu’tazilites, or any other extreme rationalists, nor was the uncreated Qur’an a unique ideology of the Shafi’i rationalists or Hanbali traditionalists; it was an evolving debate, where both sides projected a functioning argument based on reason or tradition.  Still, Ma’mun solidified the consequences on supporting the latter ideal.  As stated before, for Ma’mun and his ideological supporters, the creation of the created Qur’an unswervingly reflected the Islamic principle of tawhid or absolute unity of God.  Nawas (1994) explained:

 

The Mu’tazilite argument, which al-Ma’mun also used, is anchored in the assertation about the absolute unity of god: the Qur’an could not be eternal because, if that were the case, and object (the Qur’an) would then share an attribute of God (eternality).  This in turn would violate God’s absolute unity.  The Mu’tazilites therefore concluded that the Qur’an must be created. (p. 625)

 

For, if the Qur’an was uncreated it would be eternal; and if it was eternal it would be outside of God’s eternality.  Thus, since the Qur’an is a thing and God is the creator of all things, the Qur’an must be therefore a created thing.  This concept of tawhid formatted Ma’mun with a rational argument that supported his interpretation and gave it a sense of logic and authority.  Perhaps the true reason Ma’mun integrated the created Qur’an doctrine within his hierarchy of theology was because a created Qur’an suggests the idea that the Qur’an is not the absolute, solidified word of God and can thus be interpreted to fit a specific people or situation.

A created Qur’an imposed the concept that since the Qur’an is not the immutable word of God; subsequently, the created Qur’an was left as a supplemental guideline to something that supersedes it (Watt, 1985, p. 35).  Initially, this was the erudition of the Prophet Muhammad based on his revelations from God.  The umma depended directly on the Prophet as a leader and guide.  This doctrine sufficiently sustained a dependency on a central religious and political leader which coincided, with an ingenious congruency, with Ma’mun’s desire to reestablish his regime and the mantle of caliphate as supreme.  Again as Nawas (1994) has stated, “His was fundamentally a Mu’tazilite platform guided by an abiding conviction that the caliphal institution must survive and that its survival could be assured only by a supreme head with authority that was unquestioned, unlimited, and shared with no one else” (p. 624).

In contrast, an uncreated Qur’an signified the eternality of its origin and significance.  If the Qur’an truly merited itself as eternal, it demonstrated a strict importance in reference to the umma’s heed to the principles it established.  This concept pertained directly to traditional doctrine.  The traditionalists believed the Qur’an to be the literal word of God, yet their interpretation of God’s unity or tawid, in a sense, manifested a different quality because it was eternally part of God’s knowledge or omnipotence.  As Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1994) has so eloquently written:

 

The Qur’an is the tissue out of which the life of a Muslim is woven; its sentences are like threads from which the substance of his soul is knit.  The Prophet was therefore the instrument chosen by God for the revelation of His Word, of His Book of which both the spirit and the letter, the content and the form, are Divine. (p. 30)

 

Since God is eternal and everything within God’s unity is also eternal, and because the Qur’an is the word of God and is part of His divine speech and knowledge, the Qur’an is thus eternal.  Accordingly, nothing pertaining to or incorporated in God’s tawhid is temporal or created because of His eternality.  Furthermore, if the Qur’an is of God and part of his tawhid, it is uncreated. 

Traditional groups and individuals like the Shafi’i school of law, Ahmad Ibn Nasr Ibn Malik, who died a condemned martyr, and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal defied the rationalist doctrine of Ma’mun (Lapidus, 1975, p. 380).  Most of those who defied the rationalist doctrine were either executed or imprisoned as heretics.  Ma’mun attempted to warn further traditionalist schools of kalam that he would not only humiliate the opposition, but also censor their interpretations.  Nawas (1996) again wrote,

 

Unambiguously, then, the findings tell us that the interrogees were muhaddithun of distinction, men highly esteemed for their intellect, as well as their social status and influence—indeed, the [crème de la crème] of Baghdadi hadith-scholarship.  The caliph’s inquisition aimed at more than simply humiliating and muzzling the traditionalists.  This group of luminaries was itself a target, to be sure, but it was also the proxy through which al-Ma’mun sent a loud and clear message that henceforward the business of hadith was under his censorship, and those who transmit or teach it accountable to him. (p. 705)

 

Thus, through the mihna, Ma’mun attempted to control this opposition and solidify his role within the umma and once again fuse the religious and political elements together.

In theory, by consolidating an eclectic version of incorporated theological principles of extreme rationalist kalam and opposing all contradicting doctrine, Ma’mun enabled the ability to redeem his caliphate’s control over the interpretation of hadith.  For Ma’mun, the idea of traditional schools of kalam, who were not commissioned or controlled, secured nothing but the establishment of a destructive element within the umma that would only cause disorder.  This traditional element was definitely a force to be identified and not ignored, for it possessed the ability to nullify his power as caliph.  As established earlier, Ma’mun considered his leadership role to be the inheritor of the prophethood of Muhammad, or at least the religious authority of the Muslim community along with the official responsible for their salvation.  Therefore, since changes in the umma adapted the need for supplementing the Shari’a from the Qur’an with laws constituted from the hadith, Ma’mun desired to have the absolute authority over the interpretation of the hadith.

Yet, even though the plan seemed flawless in theory, in reality, the results manifested a different outcome.  Ma’mun underestimated the influence of those who would oppose his doctrine.  In particular, the inquisition of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal exhibited a rather phenomenal turn of momentum vis-à-vis the reputation of the mihna from the perspective of the umma (Waines, 1995, p. 70).  Amongst the orthodoxy of the traditional schools of kalam, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was the champion.  Patton (1897) illustrated:  

 

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal during his whole career subsequent to the death of the Imam al-Shafi’i (204 A.H.) was the most remarkable figure in the camp of Mohammedan orthodoxy, and during the course of the mihna did more than any other individual to strengthen the resistance of his party to the repressive efforts of the [caliphs] and their officers. (p. 2)

 

During his interrogation, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal refused to condone Ma’mun’s doctrine vindicating the created Qur’an, even under the ominous threat of the sword and incarceration (Nagel, 2000, p. 23).  Ahmad Ibn Hanbal believed adamantly that the Qur’an was uncreated even though the human acts of writing, reading, reciting, and all other acts concerning the preservation of the Qur’an were created (Patton, 1897, p. 35). 

            Even though Ma’mun did not attend the coercion of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, due to either a sense of admiration or malcontent, he anxiously awaited the outcome of the inquisition (Patton, 1897, p. 4).  Thus, when Ahmad Ibn Hanbal ultimately refused to acknowledge the created Qur’an as the only plausible theological concept, Ma’mun demonstrated an intensified intolerance for the traditional schools of kalam.  But it was essential, since Ahmad Ibn Hanbal maintained a prestigious reputation and led an exceptionally large following, to devise a punishment that would not arouse too mush dissension.  Ma’mun decided on imprisonment.

            After a brief prison sentence, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal left prison only to continue his study and interpretation of the Qur’an.  However, the damage was done; Hanbal emerged from the mihna as a venerated religious scholar, saint, and defender of tradition.  Accordingly, after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal died, his students created a school that further circulated his ideology and interpretation (Patton, 1897, p. 4-5).  Nawas (1994) clarified the following concerning the Hanbali school of law, “In the following century the new movement took the form of the form of the Hanbali school of law.  The teachings of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal were codified to become the basis of a new corpus of law and traditions, a new school in which religious thinkers adhered to the principles of the master and expounded them” (p. 622).  

 

Conclusion

 

The mihna demonstrated a tremendous development regarding the communal and sectarian elements within the umma during the ninth century.  After the mihna concluded, fifteen years later in 848, the popular local religious movement continued to amplify results with the scholarly and religious traditions of study and interpretation.  The populace concerned more about the local religious interpretations of kalam and the schools of law rather than any ruling instituted by the caliph.  With the establishment of the Hanbali school of theology and law, the evolution of authoritative power changed hands completely in favor of the local element of scholars or ulama; therefore divisions amongst the umma manifested a more prevalent nature with the opportunity to elect which schools of kalam and fiqh to follow.  Within the Hanbalis in particular, the belief of militant uprisings against any unrighteous leader, including the caliph, deemed a major absolution to the caliph’s central authority in secular government.  As Lapidus (1975) articulated, “Henceforth, the caliphate was no longer the sole identifying symbol or the sole organizing institution, even for those Muslims who had been most closely identified with it” (p. 383).     

Thus in a paradoxical result, since Ma’mun initiated the mihna not only to oppose heterogeneous groups of ulama in interpreting hadith and establishing there schools of kalam and fiqh, but to also attempt the reconfiguration of the caliphate and once again reestablish a centralized authority within the government, in actuality, the mihna, even though it lasted beyond the inquisition of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, created a  more dependant reliability based on the merit of the separate schools of kalam and fiqh, both in rational and traditional aspects.  In other words, the mihna further enabled the separation of religious authority outside of the realm of the caliphate and towards the local religious authority of the ulama.

In hindsight, the initial implications of the institution of the mihna, as influenced specifically by rational groups of kalam concerning the standard theological question of the created Qur’an, directly involved the implicit assumptions that Ma’mun desired to promote a specific group above the others, namely the Mu’tazilites.  However, this initial paradigm evolved during the course of analysis by additional scholars for the reason that new  evidence confirmed that Ma’mun was rather eclectic in regards to his own theological doctrine; for he selected principles from both the Mu’tazilites, who greatly influenced and supported Ma’mun, and the Shiite idea of imam. 

Thus the development of two newly formulated hypotheses suggested the mihna, first, demonstrated the attempt to recentralize the religious authority within the caliphate by controlling all interpretation of the Qur’an, hadith, and conception of any new laws pertaining to the umma.  This was designed to negate the ulama’s ability to establish diversified rulings and interpretations of religious doctrine on a local level.   Ma’mun vehemently believed that as caliph, he inherited the role of being a deputy to God on the earth, as his messenger, like unto the Prophet.

The second hypothesis consisted that the establishment of the mihna was presented to the umma to oppose the traditional element of ulama that, of course, refused to advocate the Qur’an as being created.  The mihna was thus designed to discourage and discredit further desire to propagate the traditional schools of ulama and impede their local authority and influence over the umma.  Ma’mun would then have the ability to spread his authority and centralized political power as caliph, which would legitimize his rule. 

However, in actuality, the two hypotheses mesh more as an interlocking plot to reconfirm and strengthen the absolute, centralized authority of the caliph by sufficiently discrediting the opposition to the point of disbandment, to insure the holding of all religious and political power, and dissolve any element that may cause future uprisings or dilution of the central caliph.   Thus rather than a fissure of two separate hypotheses, the mihna was a hierarchal scheme which incorporated both hypotheses to ensure success.  Unfortunately for Ma’mun, his plot failed.  The mihna strengthened the local authority of ulama within kalam, as well as with the creation of schools of theology and law, which would become the ultimate authority on religious interpretations of the Qur’an and the hadith, in addition to being the architectural element of the Shari’a.  In contrast, not all scholars have agreed upon the merits of the mihna, since the mihna caused immense tribulations and trouble against Muslims and Islam (Jad’aan, 2000, p. 286).

 

References

 

‘Abd al-Jabbar.  (1997).  Kitab al-usul al-khamsa.  Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol.  Oxford: One World.
 
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Figueroa, Manuel Ruiz.  (2007).  Califato y religion: Las sorprendentes iniciativas del califa al-Ma’mun (813-833).  Estudios de Asia y Africa, 42 (3), [134], 647-673.
 
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 Ibn Khalakan, Shams al-Din Ahmad.  In Ehsan Abbas (Ed.).  Vafiat al-A’ayan va Anba’Abna’ al-Zaman, (Vol. 6).  Beyrut: Dar al-Thaghafa.
 

Lapidus, Ira M.  (1975).  The separation of state and religion in the development of early Islamic society.  International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (4), 363-385.


Madelung, Wilfred.  (1985).  The origins of the controversy concerning the creation of the Koran.  Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam.  London: Variorum Reprints.
 
Mas’udi, Ali ibn Husain.  (1970).  In Abolghasem Payandeh (Ed.).  Al-Tanbih val Ashraf.  Tehran.

Melchert, Christopher.  (1997).  The adversaries of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.  Arabica, 44 (2), 234-253.

 Ibn al-Morteza, Ahmad ibn Yahya.  (1988).  Tbaghat al-Mu’tazila.  Beyrut: Dar al-Jil.

Nagel, Tilman.  (2000).  The History of Islamic Theology: From Muhammad to the Present.  (Thomas Thornton, Trans.).  Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein.  (1994).  Ideals and Realities of Islam.  Chicago: ABC International Group, Inc.

Nasution, Harun.  (1997).  Kaum Mu’tazilah dan pandangan rasionalanya (The Mu’tazila and rational philosophy).  Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol.  Oxford: Oneworld.

Nawas, John A.  (1996).  The mihna of 218 A.H. /833 A.D. revisited: an empirical study.  Journal of the American Oriental Society, 116 (4), 698-708.

Nawas, John A.  (1994).  A reexamination of three current explanations for al-Mamun’s introduction of the mihna.  International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (4), 615-629.

Patton, Walter Melville.  (1897).  Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna.  Ruprecht Karls Universitat of Heidelberg: Librairie et Imprimerie.  

Peters, J.R.T.M.  (1976).  God’s Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Mu’tazili Qadi l-Qudat Abu al-Hasan ‘Abd Al-Jabbar bin Ahmad Al-Hamadani.  Leiden: E.J. Brill.

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Waines, David.   (1995).  An Introduction to Islam.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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"Please Don't Leave This Place" (Poem)

With all my forbearance mostly lost,
I ponder if everything was actually worth the cost;
I’ve been inundated for so long, preoccupied with this notion,
And everything seems to float by me in slow motion—
Sinking down into the abyss of apathetic indifference.

Numbness has seized my soul for far too long;
This feeling emanates from the source of everything wrong.
Yet, I am so exasperated with even the slightest breath;
But, still, I claw up this mountain’s seemingly endless crest,
Just to take that feeling away—I don’t want to feel it anymore.

I’m not inured to this invidious test;
You make me so irresolute—my thoughts—I can only inchoately express.
You provoke such irascible thought;
My itinerant mind can’t stop wandering to the place it once so often sought—
It has been so long, and we were both so young;

I still see you in my reflection,
Still a part of me, my past, and perhaps a portion of my best projections.
You still have hurt me more than anyone has before;
And yet, you sacrificed us to have everything I thought I lost…restored,
Just to take the feeling away—I don’t want to feel it anymore.

I often see you in my dreams;
It is my only chance to grieve you, in midst of effervescent and radiant beams.
Although equitable justice seemed to just pass you by,
Your ephemeral time here has merely justified those severed confines,
Which exculpates this execrable blame, and offers me another dream;

My world doesn’t seem as real anymore,
Since you evanescently dissipated from all those you adore.
Your emancipation no longer fetters this notion of my soul.
You are here with me now, your memory, forever, in my control,
Just to take that feeling away—I don’t want to feel it anymore.

For those you watch, for those you grieve,
Those same angels, who guided you in, now dwell with me.
Carrying these words, which steer them to you as their rudder.
These are those last words I never really had the chance to utter.
“Don’t go.  Please don’t leave this place…”