Book Review:
All The Shah’s Men:
An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror,
by Stephen Kinzer.
New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
The
book, All The Shah’s Men: An American
Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, written by Stephen Kinzer,
provides a paradigm historical account of the rudimentary foundations of
negative relations involving western powers vis-à-vis Iranian political
security. This book, which somewhat
resembles a Robert Ludlum espionage thriller, not only explains the rise of a
new Iranian, nationalistic, democratic phenomenon under the utopian idealistic
hand of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh during the early 1950’s CE, but also
paints a relevant image of the paranoid schizophrenia which plagued the
political standoff between the eastern communist block and western democracy
during the cold war. For Stephen Kinzer,
the 1953 coup d’état in Iran not only ushered in the idea of western support
for tyrannical regimes to supplement commerce concessions of western interest,
but the coup also initiated catastrophic consequences which frequented CIA insurrections of
dissonance as well as a catalyst for puritanical literalists groups who today
flourish under the more colloquially terminology as terrorists. Thus, due to coup of 1953, relations between
the United States and Iran have completely created a polar, abhorrent schism of
political suspicion and enmity.
According
to Kinzer, the reason for the Iranian coup of 1953 revolved fundamentally on
the private Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s rights to Iranian oil intertwined with
a red scare to stir American involvement.
For most Americans, the ideal of imperialism became stagnant, in a
sense, during post-revolutionary life; imperialism later manifested an oppressive
malevolent aura following Wilson’s condemnations of the western propensity for
colonization during the Treaty of Versailles.
However, imperialism, rearing its most oppressive head, still benefited
Great Britain as an exceptional concession, within Iran, during the first five
decades of the twentieth century. Kinzer
illustrates, in his book, the detrimental decadence of British imperialism,
regarding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as the key prominent element for the
Iranian coup of 1953.
During
the first half of the twentieth century, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company legally
signed concession agreements with both Nasir al-Din Shah of the Qajar dynasty,
as well as Reza Khan or Reza Shah in 1933.
However, after the death of Reza Shah and succession of his son Muhammad
Reza Shah, the National Front movement within the Majlis or parliament, led by Mossadegh, sought for a more
nationalist approach to Iranian sovereignty, foreign imperialism, and economic
prosperity. Consequently, as Mossadegh
was elected Prime Minister, thus manifesting the majority of political power
and public support within Iran, the Iranian nationalistic movement rendered all
Iranian concessions a national commodity.
Unfortunately, for Great Britain, as Kinzer describes, this also meant
the oil concessions.
Great
Britain refused to dismiss what they referred to as their “private property” in
Iran. However, the nationalistic element
within the Majlis continued to
dismiss supplemental offers from Anglo-Iranian Board of Directors because of
their unwillingness to open their audit ledgers to Iranian officials and lack
of respect and consideration for employee rights and benefits. The United Nations, including the United
States and President Harry Truman, all tried to mend relations and erect a
compromise between Great Britain and Iran, but to no avail. For even the World Court suspended the
British claim to the oil concessions indefinitely in 1952. Great Britain refused to amend their
contract, which was notarized by Reza Shah in 1933, and Iran refused to allow
the British to operate their oil concession within the country. Great Britain initiated clandestine
operations, namely perfidious psychological warfare attributed to the British
Secret Intelligence Services or MI6, within Iran to thwart and manipulate
Iranian economic and social stability, as well as intimidation tactics in
regards to embargos and sanctions by Her Majesties Navy within the Persian
Gulf. However, these scare tactics only
resulted in the suspension of all diplomatic relations between Iran and the
British, which left the British in search for an ally, with access to Iran, to
aide their cause.
Initially,
according to Kinzer, the relationship with Iran and the United States was
rather positive, especially pertaining to the Truman administration and Mossadegh
himself. In fact, Truman, as Kinzer
portrays, supported Iran and Mossadegh in their desire for the nationalization
of Iran and their concessions including the oil dispute and Great Britain. Truman felt that the British were just too
prideful to admit their faults and compromise a new contractual agreement;
however, Truman also had to deny financial aid to Iran due to this western
alliance. The standoff between the
British and Iran would not be resolved and stood stagnant by Truman’s refusal
to take sides. However, the tides turned
with the re-election of Winston Churchill and election of President Dwight
Eisenhower.
Eisenhower’s
election to the American presidency fashioned an ecstatic reception amongst
covert operations within the British government because of his adamant stand
against communism. Senior agent,
Christopher Montague Woodhouse appealed directly to the newly appointed and
extremely ambitious secretary of state and CIA director John Foster Dulles and
Allen Dulles. Woodhouse most cleverly
advocated the Dulles brothers’ desire to annihilate communism as a fuel to
ignite the fire of mutual coalition in regard to the potential Iranian
communist takeover. Kinzer writes, “This
appeal was calculated to stir the two brothers who would direct American
foreign policy after Eisenhower’s inauguration.
John Foster Dulles, the incoming secretary of state, and Allen Dulles,
the incoming CIA director, were among the fiercest of Cold Warriors.” Thus, with the Dulles brothers on board,
Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt was named as covert
field agent and Operation AJAX commenced.
Kinzer
expresses that within the initial tactics of Operation Ajax, Roosevelt proved
to be an extraordinarily and formidable coup instigator and improviser. Initially, Roosevelt planned a shift in
regime control. Due to the steady
infiltration of anti-Mossadegh propaganda, coordinated by mercenary-like
Iranians including Shaban “The Brainless,” Jafari, British/Iranians spies, and
the well informed and wealthy elite Rashidian brothers, as well as coordinated,
fundamentalist, anti-Mossadegh religious sermons maintained by Ayatollah
Kashani, this milieu of gradual dissonance created an ambivalent yearning for
anti-Mossadegh protests. Shah Muhammad
Reza Shah, also orchestrated by Roosevelt, signed a firmans for the dismissal
and arrest of Mossadegh and placement of General Zahedi as the new prime
minister. However, on the night of
August 15th, 1953, the coup failed by an internal plot leak; thus
the Shah fled the country, Zahedi went into hiding, and all participants (who
were found) of the coup were rounded up and arrested. Fortunately for the United States and
Britain, both Zahedi and Roosevelt avoided capture and plotted to strike again
as soon as possible.
As
Kinzer articulates in his book, Roosevelt believed that the succession of the
coup would “ultimately be decided on the streets” and in the masses. Thus, he continued to pay informants, hire
mercenaries and fundamentalist mullahs to insight riots and extend the public
element of rampaging masses. At first
Roosevelt choose to insight riots in favor of Mossadegh and opposing the
monarchy, which made the public truly wonder if Mossadegh was just another tyrant. The next day he instigated riots opposing
Mossadegh, in which Mossadegh played into the Gambit and sent police to detain
and suppress the Riots. Since the image
of Mossadegh was literally changing over night by the manipulations of
Roosevelt, all Roosevelt needed to do now was to establish military support for
the Zahedi take over. Roosevelt then
bribed military leaders by payoffs and the distribution of the signed firmans
for Mossadegh’s removal. With a somewhat
controlled element within the masses, Roosevelt manipulated and channeled to
next day’s riot to oppose Mossadegh, rally additional support for the Shah,
exchange regimes, and proclaim Zahedi as the new prime minister. After the initial failure, the resourceful
improvised coup the following week on August 19th, 1953, ran like clockwork.
To
Kinser, even though Roosevelt appears as either a hero or villain, the true
hero of the story was none other than Mossadegh. Kinser’s book illustrates Mossadegh as being
a beacon of hope for the country of Iran, nationalism and democracy within the
Middle East. Kinser describes Mossadegh
as an honest, benevolent person who truly desired and implored to ameliorate
Iranian society and well-being through nationalism and democracy. Kinser portrays Mossadegh’s fall from grace
as martyrdom and a betrayal by the United States government and Iran
itself. Even though Kinser portrays the
events of the Iranian coup of 1953 as objective whimsical attempt to once again
legitimize British oil concessions in Iran under the guise of stopping the
“domino effect or theory,” Kinzer expresses an unwritten sense of repugnance
for ignorant British imperialists and the Dulles brothers’ hunger for power and
lack of consideration for the future consequences of United States insurgencies
or “black, covert ops.” For Kinser, this initial coup unleashed a
realization for the CIA’s cheap ability to fix and manipulate world
affairs. Kinzer writes, “[Speaking of
John Foster and Allen Dulles] their decisions to make Iran the first
battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve
to be judged harshly for the way they made it.”
For
Kinzer, Operation AJAX demonstrated decay in the foundation myth of the
American nation; what originally hailed to being founded by God as a free
nation that is honest, free, and provides liberty and justice for all, now
instead insidiously topples governments, in a form of modern imperialism, for
capitalism. Kinzer attributes Operation
AJAX as the deterrent for freedom and democracy within the Middle East, in which
also created a mistrust for American involvement in world affairs. Kinser notes,
Operation AJAX taught tyrants and aspiring tyrants there
that the world’s most powerful governments were willing to tolerate limitless
oppression as long as oppressive regimes were friendly to the West and to
Western oil companies. That helped tilt
the political balance in a vast region away from freedom and towards
dictatorship.
For Kinser, Operation AJAX directly influenced in the
vehement, intolerable relationship between the United States and Iran
today. Kinser expresses that after the
coup in 1953 and the re-establishment of the Muhammad Reza Shah’s monarchy,
Reza Shah became oppressive dictator by enslaving the Iranian people and
threatening their security by means of torture and incarceration. This resulted in the shattering explosion of
Islamic fundamentalism,
which of course incited the hostage takeover of the American embassy in Tehran
after the United States provided asylum and amnesty to the dictator that was
meticulously placed in Operation AJAX.
This furthered the fission between the United States and Iran. Kinser continues to state that because of the
souring relations, the United States supported the Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein in Iraq’s war with Iran which, of course, helped Hussein consolidate
power within Iraq. Finally, as the
relationship between the United States and Iran manifested a complete schism in
international relations, religious puritanical literalists such as Khomeini and
Khamenei consolidated their power in Iran and initiated and anti-western
campaign which included supporting so-called radical groups like Hamas and
Hezbollah; these groups would inspire other radical groups such as the Taliban
and Osama bin-Laden. Thus, Kinser links
Operation AJAX to modern terrorist acts.
Kinser states, “It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation AJAX
through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the
fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.”
Hence,
even though Kinser’s book appears to be a surreal attempt for a Hollywood
Espionage Thriller, his historical research and source material definitely
warrants an extremely valid presentation of the Iranian coup of 1953. Kinzer is very bold with his chain of
influence regarding Operation AJAX as a direct link to the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001. But,
Kinser definitely links Operation AJAX as a fallible catalyst that has
influenced the soured relationship between the United States and Iran. Kinzer’s book also merits a further
investigation of the source material by the United States government, to not
only make amends, but to also prevent future fallible attempts to manipulate
world affairs.
Bibliography
Kinzer, Stephen. All The Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the
Roots of Middle East Terror. New
Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 20
